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Abstract. This paper discusses different needs and approaches to es-
tablishing “causation” that are relevant in legal cases involving statis-
tical input based on epidemiological (or more generally observational
or population-based) information.
We distinguish between three versions of “cause”: the first involves
negligence in providing or allowing exposure, the second involves “cause”
as it is shown through a scientifically proved increased risk of an out-
come from the exposure in a population, and the third considers “cause”
as it might apply to an individual plaintiff based on the first two. The
population-oriented “cause” is that commonly addressed by statisti-
cians, and we propose a variation on the Bradford Hill approach to
testing such causality in an observational framework, and discuss how
such a systematic series of tests might be considered in a legal context.
We review some current legal approaches to using probabilistic state-
ments, and link these with the scientific methodology as developed here.
In particular, we provide an approach both to the idea of individual
outcomes being caused on a balance of probabilities, and to the idea of
material contribution to such outcomes.
Statistical terminology and legal usage of terms such as “proof on
the balance of probabilities” or “causation” can easily become con-
fused, largely due to similar language describing dissimilar concepts;
we conclude, however, that a careful analysis can identify and separate
those areas in which a legal decision alone is required and those areas
in which scientific approaches are useful.
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE ELEMENTS OF
ASSOCIATION
Deciding whether relationships between outcomes
and associated actions and events are causal lies, in
quite different ways, at the hearts of both the legal
system and the scientific process.
This is an electronic reprint of the original article
published by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics in
Statistical Science, 2007, Vol. 22, No. 2, 227–254. This
reprint differs from the original in pagination and
typographic detail.
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In the traditional sense, as developed in physics,
for example, causal relationships are established in
science by showing that a certain exposure is vir-
tually inescapably linked to an outcome, through
a process of repeatable experimental studies and
through development of rigorous models for such
linkage. A typical example of this traditional process
is in the development of the laws of motion; every
experiment shows how application of the same force
consistently leads to the same motion, and we then
uncover a “model” which describes how (if not why)
the causal relationship “works.”
No such experimentation is available for the de-
velopment of explanatory models in traditional legal
methods. A legal dispute as considered here is one
which is typically resolved by considering general
and specific actions and exposures involving a plain-
tiff who has suffered from some single rather than
repeated outcome and deciding, through considera-
tion of all known possible explanations, whether it
has been shown “on the balance of probabilities” (in
civil cases) that the defendant indeed “caused” the
actions leading to the exposures which then further
“caused” the outcome. In particular, we focus on le-
gal cases that involve statistical input based on both
population-level and individual-level information.
Here we have immediately and deliberately intro-
duced a two-stage causal chain, from an action A al-
leged to have been taken by the defendant, to an ex-
posure E alleged to be “caused” by the action, to an
outcome O alleged to be “caused” by the exposure,
operating at two levels, the population and the in-
dividual. The terms “action,” “exposure” and “out-
come” are used here as convenient and very widely
covering terms, not intended to be interpreted in
any way narrowly, and we will illustrate them with
sundry examples.
One well-known example is the Dalkon Shield cases
[60]. The Dalkon Shield is a contraceptive intrauter-
ine device (IUD) which led to a string of complaints
particularly regarding high pregnancy rates, infertil-
ity and pelvic inflammatory disease (PID). Hawkin-
son v A. H. Robins Co., Inc. [91] was an action
brought by a class of women who had used the Dalkon
Shield which they purchased from Robins. Robins
had released a patient information brochure which
claimed that women could safely wear the IUD for
five years or longer. Case-control and cohort studies
showed that the risks associated with the Dalkon
Shield were substantially larger than those adver-
tised by Robins. Robins was found to have negli-
gently misrepresented the effectiveness and safety
of its product.
Thus in a legal setting, in this case it had at least
to be established that the defendant did take an ac-
tion (say, failing to warn of hazards while selling the
Dalkon Shield, or failing to test sufficiently for such
hazards) responsible for the exposure (usage of the
Dalkon Shield by the plaintiff) which involved a risk
of harm. Then further it must be established that
such an exposure did “cause” the outcome (such as
PID) for which compensation is sought.
In a similar vein, in Sindell v Abbott Laborato-
ries [102], the manufacturers of DES, a drug pre-
scribed for the relief of morning sickness in pregnant
women, were sued for causing a rare vaginal cancer
in these women’s daughters [20, 102]. Also, compen-
sation was sought for skin and other health disorders
by Vietnam War soldiers exposed to the defoliant
agent Agent Orange [58, 93]; and workers in an as-
bestos mill sought compensation for health effects
associated with exposure to asbestos [79]. These ex-
amples are discussed in more detail later.
The two-stage causal chain will be seen to hold
for the individual plaintiff as well. For example, in
Ybarra v Spangard [106], a surgical team was re-
quired to explain what had happened to cause an
injury; in Wilsher v Essex Health Authority [105],
medical defendants were charged with causing al-
most total blindness in a prematurely born baby by
the administration of excess oxygen through misin-
serting a tube into a vein instead of an artery; and
in McGhee v National Coal Board [97] the plaintiff
was exposed to brick dust after work, suffered skin
disease and accused the employer of being liable be-
cause shower facilities were not provided.
In this paper we consider the ways in which sci-
entific and legal proof intertwine when the second
of the “causal steps” described above, from expo-
sure to outcome, involves scientific reasoning from
population-based studies, in particular epidemiolog-
ical studies. This is an important area for current
debate, as in an increasing number of legal cases
this step of the legal process involves an appeal to
a population-based relationship: the Dalkon Shield
cases [60], the effects of Agent Orange [58, 93] and
the DES case [102] are major examples.
For population-based studies, as opposed to ex-
perimental studies, the general statistical concept of
a causal relationship has a likeness to general cau-
sation in the legal system. Causation is asserted (as
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we develop in more detail in Section 3 and the Ap-
pendix) largely by observation of an otherwise un-
explained association of the potential agent and the
possible effect. Evidence from a number of sources is
used to establish that results can be explained only
by the potential agent, and not by other causes or
by pure chance; and (at least until disputed by other
evidence) the relationship is then accepted. For legal
application, this general or population-based causa-
tion must be established at the level of exposure
suffered by the plaintiff.
On the face of it, the legal concept of “proof on the
balance of probabilities” and the population-based
requirement of “statistical significance” appear to
belong to the same traditions of proof: we accept
the conclusion as being the most satisfactory pos-
sible even in the face of uncertainty or doubt. For
practical purposes, in the scientific arena an asso-
ciation will not be considered to be confirmed at
least until it is shown to be statistically significant.
The legal concept is more lenient: if a court accepts
a statement as proved on the balance of probabili-
ties, it is accepted as certain for practical purposes
even though it may have been found only to be more
likely than not to be true.
Because of these similarities, when population-
based studies are used in legal disputes, there is con-
siderable possibility for confusion about the stan-
dards to be applied which should lead to a conclu-
sion that causation has been “proved” in one or the
other arena. One of our goals here is to clarify the
differences in approaches, and to describe how the
scientific ideas can in fact be used effectively in the
legal context. Some of the legal questions and issues
are stated by Peppin [48], Stapleton [61] and Price
[49], among others.
However, there is one issue which lies at the heart
of the difference between science and the law and
this will be quite crucial in understanding their in-
teraction. This is the fact that, for the law, there
is in essence a single plaintiff (an individual, or a
group of individuals in a class action) and the law
has to decide on causation of outcome to each indi-
vidual plaintiff; there must be consideration of the
evidence relevant to the actual circumstances of the
plaintiff. The population-studying scientist, in our
examples usually an epidemiologist, seeks rather to
decide whether overall the relationship affects the
“population” as a whole, rather than whether any
individual in the population is affected. Causality
in a legal case must then allow for the transfer of
such population-based arguments to individual cir-
cumstances, that is, from general to individual cau-
sation.
Within the court, then, at least two kinds of toxic
tort causation must be proved: general or population-
based causation (is the agent capable of causing the
disease that the plaintiff suffers at the exposure suf-
fered by the plaintiff?) through a preponderance of
evidence, and specific or individual causation (did
the agent cause this particular plaintiff’s disease?).
Thus there will be a plaintiff who has suffered from
an individual outcome which we denote (Oind) and
wishes to have it decided that the individual expo-
sure, which we denote (Eind) led to the individual
outcome (Oind); and equally centrally, that (Eind)
was due to an action (A). Thus the relationship the
plaintiff seeks to prove can be visualized as
(A)→ (Eind)→ (Oind).
The first link (A)→ (Eind) requires the establish-
ment not only of both the action and exposure, but
also that performing the action (A) involved negli-
gence. Thus it is not so much the action (A) that the
plaintiff must prove. Rather, it must be proved that
the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and
that this duty was breached by the defendant taking
the action (A) and producing the exposure (Eind),
which may cause the plaintiff harm. It is only then
that the question of culpability arises.
Often the court is focused more on testing this
first link (A)→ (Eind) and it may be quite clear
that the second holds. As an extreme case example,
it may not be in doubt that exposure to a dose of
arsenic (E) caused death (Oind), and the question
is clearly whether the exposure followed from the
defendant’s action. Equally, the role of science has
often focused on the second link (E)→ (O); in par-
ticular, epidemiology is concerned with whether the
exposure in the population (Epop) is linked with an
outcome (Opop) in that population. In the cases we
consider, there will be doubts not only as to whether
the individual outcome was caused by the exposure,
but even whether for the general population this ex-
posure causes the outcome.
Diagrammatically, then, the law wishes to assess
whether any or all of the following set of implications
(or causal chains) have been established:
(Epop)→ (Opop)
↓(1)
(A)→ (Eind)→ (Oind).
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Our primary goal in this paper is to discuss the ways
in which such relationships are established in a sta-
tistical and in a legal sense. This will be done in
Sections 3 to 5. Prior to this, however, we will de-
fine more carefully the structure we have sketched
above, and give more concrete examples of the types
of links which may occur in a causal chain. These
examples, taken both from existing legal cases on
which judgment has been given, and from epidemi-
ological studies not necessarily yet in legal dispute,
are intended to illustrate a range of possible rela-
tionships and the issues that need to be given con-
sideration.
Throughout this paper, we will take the view that
causality must be proved, rather than “lack of causal-
ity” disproved: this is in accord with the statistical
concept of commencing with a null hypothesis that
there is no causality or even association, and it is
attuned to the defendant’s viewpoint in legal situ-
ations since the onus is placed on the plaintiff to
establish that causal relationships really do exist. In
Australia, legislation [75] provides that the plaintiff
bears the onus of proving, on the balance of proba-
bilities, that the defendant caused the harm. How-
ever, as Carver [5] explains, Shorey v PT Ltd [101]
has provided that “the defendant still holds an ev-
idential onus of proof to try to displace the infer-
ences of causation supplied by evidence presented
by the plaintiff.” This shifting of the onus of proof
often tends to occur where there are multiple pos-
sible actions or exposures, as discussed by Fleming
[17]: for example, in Ybarra v Spangard [106] the
surgical team was required to explain the actions
that had caused an injury, although inWilsher [105]
the defendant was not required to prove that, say,
low birth weight rather than the allegedly negligent
treatment had caused the outcome of interest.
2. DEFINING THE ELEMENTS AND LINK
TYPES IN A CAUSAL CHAIN
“Actions,” “exposures” and “outcomes” can de-
scribe a wide variety of events. We will consider the
situation in which there is a case brought by a plain-
tiff (an individual, or a class action brought by a
group of supposedly similarly affected individuals)
against a defendant (which may be a single entity
or a group of entities defending together or sepa-
rately). The complications caused by a multiplicity
of plaintiffs or defendants are real ones in the legal
system, but they do not affect the issues we discuss
and we only briefly touch on them in Section 4.3.
We will find it simpler to work back from outcomes
to exposures to actions.
2.1 Outcomes
We assume here that there is one outcome of inter-
est which is an individual harm suffered by a plain-
tiff. Corresponding with the harm is loss and dam-
age, without which there would be no liability and
prima facie no action. Since we focus on situations
in which there is a population-based relationship, we
take an outcome to be usually an illness, disease or
other personal injury, as with the onset of PID in the
Dalkon shield cases [60] or cancer of the daughters
in the DES case [102].
In our discussion, we typically assume that the oc-
currence of harm has been established. This may not
be trivial, even when the outcome appears to be well
defined, since some diseases are not easily diagnosed;
for example, mild forms of PID may escape diagno-
sis; and some cases of asbestosis are not identified
until after death. Although the court does need to
be assured of the existence of the alleged outcome,
interaction with statistical reasoning is limited at
this stage, and we ignore this issue in what follows.
After determining that there is an outcome, a caus-
al link must be established between the exposure
and the outcome. Recent special cases have seen
compensation awarded on the basis of increased risk.
In essence, this implies a concept of virtual equiva-
lence between (Epop)→ (Opop) and (Eind)→ (Oind)
and it leaves it possible for the court to establish
such equivalence merely by assuring that the indi-
vidual is part of the relevant population for which
the population risk is established. The interaction
with statistical methodology would be almost para-
mount in such legal decisions.
2.2 Exposure, (Epop)→ (Opop) and
(Eind)→ (Oind)
“Exposure” is the name we give to the agent which
is suspected of being causal, to which the population
or individual is exposed.
The link between exposure and outcome can be
dramatic and self-evident. In the case of a car acci-
dent, exposure is being hit by the vehicle, and the in-
dividual relationship (Eind)→ (Oind) needs no proof.
But exposure in the situations we consider will of-
ten be far more subtle, and will involve the plaintiff
claiming to be part of a more general exposed pop-
ulation: the users of the Dalkon shield, the workers
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in an asbestos mill, the soldiers exposed to Agent
Orange in Vietnam.
There are three categories of possible relationship
that we will differentiate. Note that we say “possible
relationship” quite deliberately, since the whole goal
is to determine whether the proposed relationship
does actually hold. We give below a categorization
of possible relationships which require somewhat dif-
ferent proofs of causation.
R(0): Necessary and sufficient relationship: In this
situation, which we might denote E↔ O, there is
one possible exposure under consideration and we
seek to show that it is necessary and sufficient for the
outcome. This is the traditional meaning of “causal”
in both legal and scientific arenas. Legislation in
Australia [75] expressly requires that for causation
to be established, the exposure must be a “neces-
sary condition” of the harm (see Section 4). If suffi-
ciency also holds, so that there is only one possible
exposure, then assessing an individual relationship
is more relevant than a population relationship.
The typical example is in cases of accidental or
deliberate injury: the leg was broken (Oind) because
the car hit the plaintiff (Eind), and conversely with-
out the car hitting the plaintiff there would have
been no broken leg; or the arsenic administration
was both necessary and sufficient for the poisoning.
In population-based relationships it may be the
case that the exposure is found to be sufficient [with,
say, (Eind) being asbestos exposure, and (Opop) be-
ing occurrence of mesothelioma]; but it is much less
likely that it is necessary. Pursuing the same exam-
ple, even mesothelioma can be ideopathic (so that
chance or background cases occur without asbestos
exposure), if very rarely [53]. Our next two classifi-
cations delineate such situations.
R(1): Relationships with a single identified expo-
sure: In this situation we have only one (in the legal
context, potentially compensable) exposure of inter-
est, denoted (EC), or at least only one identified,
which might have caused the outcome (O). There
are, however, other known background cases of the
outcome which occurred without exposure to EC
and which were caused by chance or other (unidenti-
fied) exposures; we denote these collectively by EB.
This situation may be depicted as (EC,EB)→ (O).
In trying to prove, in the population, that (ECpop)→
(Opop) is causal, we must show in essence that all
of the outcomes are not just background, but that
some are due to (EC). Moreover, in anticipation of
the legal case before us, we must show that this re-
lationship holds at the level of exposure suffered by
the plaintiff.
Typical examples of R(1) might include the DES
case [102], or the relationship in a population be-
tween exposure to radiation and later occurrence
of various cancers. In the first, the exposure (ECind)
is the ingestion of the drug DES and the outcome
(Oind) is appearance of the cancerous lesions of the
vagina in the daughter after puberty. In appealing
to the supporting causal link (ECpop)→ (Opop), no
other exposure was claimed to be explanatory for
the outcome of cancer in the daughters, and it was
found that the individual relationship was causal.
In population-based studies, exposure to high lev-
els of radiation (ECpop) has been found to be asso-
ciated with increased occurrences of particular can-
cers (Opop) [78]. There is also a background level
of cancer occurrences to be considered, but no other
identified “nonbackground” exposure is identified as
potentially causal.
The questions in R(1) usually concern the validity
of the association (ECpop)→ (Opop). Even though no
other potential cause is identified, it is still necessary
to prove that the observed association is not just a
fortuitous juxtaposition of occurrences of both ex-
posure and outcome that has been observed, or that
some other confounding factor is not responsible for
the observation, as we discuss in Section 2.4.
R(2): Relationships with several identified expo-
sures: “Background exposure” is a relatively unsat-
isfactory portmanteau phrase for exposures which
might be explanatory of an outcome, and seeking
to find other explanations is common to both the
law (because such alternatives might provide a more
plausible defense than mere chance or background)
and to science (in which finding such potential ex-
planations is usually the crux of ongoing research).
Here we have several identified contributory expo-
sures (EC,{E j},EB) which may be responsible for
(O): EC is the specific exposure for which compen-
sation is sought; {E j} is a set of other possible iden-
tified exposures and EB is background exposure.
In proving, even in the population, that (ECpop)→
(Opop), we have to ensure now that the outcomes
are neither just background nor all due to the al-
ternative exposures. It has certainly been seen as
a harder decision for the courts to rule in individ-
ual cases that the compensable exposure has been
causal if other exposures can be positively identi-
fied which might have caused the outcome. This is
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particularly the case if the other exposures are non-
compensable.
It is instructive to consider two examples which
indicate the potential for different conclusions when
on the face of it the framework is similar.
In Wilsher v Essex Health Authority [105], the ex-
posure (ECind), the excess oxygen given at the birth,
was not in dispute. However, the fact that there were
several other identified potential causes of the out-
come (Oind) of almost total blindness in the baby
(including low birth weight, apnea and number of
transfusions) seemed to make a court determination
difficult. This was exacerbated in this case because
the association between (ECpop)→ (Opop) varies ac-
cording to exposure levels and because the status
of each of the other population relations (E jpop)→
(Opop) is not clear-cut.
On the other hand, in McGhee v National Coal
Board [97] the plaintiff argued that he was exposed
to brick dust after work (ECind) as his employer did
not provide shower facilities. This brick dust expo-
sure allegedly caused dermatitis (Oind), and the gen-
eral causation or population link (ECpop)→ (Opop)
appears undisputed. Although he was also exposed
to brick dust at work, which is an exposure in the
set {E jind} associated with (Oind), in this case it
was found that the link (ECind)→ (Oind) was proven
and that it was of sufficient contribution relative to
{E jind} to be compensated.
2.3 Actions
Actions are those things done or left undone by
the defendant which are alleged to have caused the
exposure. It is often not the action per se that the
plaintiff must prove, but that the defendant breached
a duty of care to the plaintiff, which caused the
plaintiff harm.
These may be obvious actions, such as driving the
vehicle which struck the plaintiff, or firing the bul-
let which killed the victim. They may be slightly less
obvious or more disputable actions, such as allow-
ing asbestos fibers to be free in the workplace as in
[86] or misinserting a tube into a vein rather than
an artery leading to excess oxygen as in Wilsher
[105]. There may also be actions which are more
properly termed inactions: the failure to adequately
test products, or the failure to advertise potential
harmful effects, both of which are relevant to PID
occurrence associated with use of the Dalkon Shield
[60] and the failure to provide showers for removing
brick dust after work, as in McGhee [97].
Within population-based cases, one situation in
which the role of statistical analysis may become
increasingly important is where there is an “indeter-
minate defendant” [17]. Even if exposure is proven
and the association (ECind)→ (Oind) is accepted, it
may be difficult to determine which one of many
potential defendants caused an exposure in a par-
ticular plaintiff. Here, then, there is a set of actions
(AC,{Aj}) leading to (ECind) but the particular com-
pensable action AC is unidentifiable.
This occurred, for example, in the allegation of
exposure to DES in Sindell v Abbott Laboratories
[102]. Here the actual manufacturer of the drug in-
gested by an individual plaintiff’s mother was not
known and could have been one of a number of dif-
ferent companies: five companies were sued as po-
tentially compensable. In this case a “market share”
approach to allocating compensation for the step
(A) → (Epop) was adopted and individual plaintiffs
did not have to prove that a specific defendant was
responsible for (A)→ (Eind). The courts have, how-
ever, begun to move away from this market share
approach; this is considered in more detail in Sec-
tion 4.3.
So there is a role for scientific proof in showing
that actions caused exposures, especially through
forensic sciences and perhaps through population-
based arguments, but in general it is not the concern
of our thinking here.
2.4 Describing the Causal Links
Once the events O,E and A have been established,
we can inspect the links between them and make, in
particular, two assessments: whether the link is di-
rect or indirect, and how to describe any interaction
between multiple events. As illustration, here we fo-
cus on the link between an exposure of interest, EC,
and a single outcome O. Three types of links be-
tween EC and O can be identified.
No confounding of EC. In this situation EC is be-
lieved to be directly related to O, with no other
identified exposures which might mitigate the asso-
ciation. The cases R(0) and R(1) may be described
in this way.
Indirect link through a confounding exposure. In
this situation we find that although an association
between EC and O is observed, there is no actual
causal relation. Rather, EC impacts on, or is closely
associated with, another exposure E which is caus-
ing O, in such a way that EC is rendered noncausal.
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An excellent example of this in the epidemiologi-
cal context is the relationship between poppers and
AIDS. In the early part of the study of AIDS,
population-based studies showed that users of “pop-
pers” (amyl nitrate) were associated with AIDS oc-
currence, or with being HIV-positive, more than were
nonusers of poppers. We can then ask whether this
is a causal relationship: do poppers, as an exposure
(E), cause AIDS as an outcome (O)? Ultimately
it was established that was not the case: poppers
were associated closely with certain sexual activi-
ties, which were satisfactorily shown to be the causal
agent in the spread of the virus.
Combined exposures, contributing directly and in-
directly to outcome. The third situation which may
be distinguished, and which occurs often under R(2),
is one in which there are interconnections between
the various exposures and both the potentially com-
pensable exposure EC and another exposure E (or
other exposures {E j}) are all contributing causally
to an outcome.
This is by far the most difficult to deal with. Con-
tinuing the AIDS example, consider a population
exposed both to homosexual practices and to blood
transfusions. Both of these are known to lead to in-
creased incidence of AIDS. Here there is no reason
to expect that being homosexual increases the pre-
disposition to contract AIDS from blood transfu-
sions or vice versa. The increased incidence should
therefore be essentially the sum of the increased in-
cidences from the two separate exposures considered
independently.
We might express this link in which the two ex-
posures independently affect the outcome in a pop-
ulation by an additive model depicted diagrammat-
ically as
[ECpop→Opop] + [E
1
pop →Opop]
with EC representing blood transfusions, say, and
E1 homosexuality.
As a second example, we take studies of the as-
sociation between asbestos and lung cancer (and, of
course, other diseases such as mesothelioma). At the
Wittenoom mine in Western Australia, exposure to
airborne asbestos fiber (crocidolite) appears to have
been widespread (ECpop). Studies of the population
of exposed miners indicate an increase in the inci-
dence of lung cancer, when compared to other un-
exposed persons [1]. Industrial exposure to amosite
and chrysotile asbestos dust has been studied in
England and the United States [1]. However, the
majority of asbestos workers are also active smok-
ers, and the increased incidence of lung cancer in
active smokers is well documented [13]. Hence again
we have a situation in which the relationship of as-
bestos to lung cancer (Opop) is confounded with the
relationship of smoking to lung cancer as an alter-
native exposure (E1pop).
As a further example we note that in the studies
of IUD and PID occurrence, there is confounding
in an unexpected way: it appears that the use of
oral contraceptives is likely to be protective for PID
occurrence, so that if (as is usually the case) there
are oral contraceptors in the control or unexposed
group in a study, then this group will show lower
than normal PID occurrence, which results in the
exposed group appearing to have a relatively higher
than normal PID occurrence rate.
All of these possibilities might be depicted through
a synergistic model, in which the various exposures
interact and contribute more (or sometimes less) ex-
cess incidence of the outcome than would be ex-
pected from the individual exposures alone. Dia-
grammatically we may write this as
(ECpop +E
1
pop +E
C
pop •E
1
pop)→Opop(2)
with ECpop • E
1
pop indicating the interactive effect of
EC and E1.
A variant on this situation occurs in the assess-
ment of causal relationships between the use of an
IUD and outcomes of PID and infertility. The use
of the Dalkon Shield (ECpop) appears to be associ-
ated directly with increased incidence of infertil-
ity (Opop). It is also directly associated with PID
(O1pop), which is itself directly and causally linked
to infertility. Thus we have both a direct and an
indirect link between (ECpop) and (Opop).
We discuss briefly in Section 4 the way in which
the courts might deal with such multiple causes,
once established; this, however, is their role and not
the role of statisticians or economists, as has been
well expressed by Robins and Greenland [51]. Rather,
our emphasis in this paper is on the way in which
the two disciplines manage to prove that any such
relationships are established at all.
2.5 Testing for Causation
A legal two-limb test for causation using the re-
sults of an epidemiological study was described in
Seltsam [100]:
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1. General Causation—Is the exposure, more prob-
ably than not, capable of causing or contributing
to the outcome in the population?
2. Specific Causation—Was the outcome in the in-
dividual case, more probably than not, caused or
contributed to by the exposure the individual was
subjected to?
This legal test is almost the equivalent to the two-
step scientific test for causation defined in Section
1.
1. Has a “scientific” causal relationship (Epop)→
(Opop) been established in the (relevant) popula-
tion?
2. On the balance of probabilities, was the plaintiff ’s
individual outcome caused by the exposure?
We now consider the establishment of these two
steps separately.
3. ESTABLISHING GENERAL OR
POPULATION-BASED CAUSATION
We restrict ourselves here to situations involving
observational studies on human populations, that is,
to the methodology one might employ to prove that
the relationship (Epop)→ (Opop) is actually causal.
Moreover, for focus we will concentrate on epi-
demiological studies of the effects of exposure to al-
legedly or potentially harmful substances, so that
there is a compensable outcome. Thus we are specif-
ically thinking of claims against defendants, and not
forming public policy. For example, the former re-
quires establishment of causality before a defendant
is ordered to pay compensation to individual plain-
tiffs, and consequently more detailed consideration
of the types of links between (Epop) and (Opop); the
latter may require a more lenient demonstration of
association (Epop →Opop), sufficient to support the
adoption of a policy of prudent avoidance of the ex-
posure.
Nevertheless, policy considerations have an inte-
gral role in determining causation in a negligence
action. This was first established in Australia by the
High Court in March v Stramare [96] where it laid
down the commonsense and experience test. The re-
cent civil liability reform in Australia has placed a
greater emphasis upon the analysis of policy and
commonsense in determining in tort cases [8]. Be-
cause of this, there can be no strict universal level
of contribution indicative of causation since this can
change according to the facts and circumstances of
the case. Nevertheless, for there to be causation in
any given case, the principles set out in this section
and in Section 4 must be satisfied [53].
Spigelman [100], paragraph 183, found that the
determination of whether the evidence is capable of
bearing the inference is for the courts to decide us-
ing a “commonsense approach,” and commented on
what would be commonsense in terms of examining
epidemiological evidence:
“the proposition that the stronger the as-
sociation the lower the probability that it
would occur without a causal relationship,
is a commonsense proposition which a court
will readily accept. The same is true of
the proposition that inconsistency of re-
sults undermines an inference of causa-
tion.”—at paragraph 147.
It is thus incumbent on the scientist to clearly
establish the epidemiological support for a causal
argument prior to a court’s consideration of this ev-
idence.
3.1 Philosophical Theories and Pragmatic Tests
of Causation
There exists a substantial philosophical theory of
causation. Much of the philosophical writing on this
topic is concerned primarily with the problem of es-
tablishing cause with certitude (see, e.g., [55] for sev-
eral papers on the writings of Hume and Popper in
relevant areas; also see [26]).
We will accept without any great surprise or con-
cern that in both the legal and applied statistics
arenas an established cause is always subject to fal-
sification: new evidence, new experiments can over-
turn previously accepted decisions or theories, and
even Newton’s Laws of Motion, perhaps as well es-
tablished as any causal association can be, were sub-
ject to substantial modification by Einstein. We are
concerned, rather, with how, on the facts available
at a given time, one might assert that causation is
satisfactorily shown.
We will argue the view that, both for practicing
scientists and for lawyers, proof of a causal relation-
ship is:
(a) provided by passing a number of tests of a gen-
eral nature, as delineated in Section 3.4 and the
Appendix,
(b) susceptible of qualification, with “strong” or
“weak” proof being reasonable concepts, based
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on the way in which the tests in (a) are passed,
and also on a knowledge of the importance of the
assumptions made (often implicitly) in reaching
conclusions,
(c) susceptible of later reversal or falsification, in
the light of new data or concepts being accepted.
It is this last point (c) which allows lawyers and
scientists to live comfortably with operational ideas
of causality somewhat outside the philosophical atti-
tudes of Hume or Popper. The falsifiability, refutabil-
ity or testability of a scientific method is a key crite-
rion of the method’s scientific status and also of its
legal status since the decision of Daubert [85], which
cited Popper’s approach in the opinion (see Section
3.5 for more detail about the legal acceptance of a
method).
One cause of (c) in a current legal context is the
limitations period: the scientific knowledge may not
yet be complete, but still the Court must make a
decision regardless of subsequent developments [21].
In the adversarial process, the duty is on the parties,
not the Court, to produce the evidence. The Court
is then bound to make a decision on the basis of
the evidence submitted. As Gastwirth [21] explains,
even if the decision is made in the absence of im-
portant studies or literature or if studies arise after
the decision which contradict the decision, the legal
decision is not necessarily wrong. If the Court gives
due consideration to each piece of evidence and jus-
tifies the reliance placed on each piece of evidence,
then the Court will have fulfilled its duties [21].
It is worth stressing that the second point (b) may
not be fully realized by the courts as applying to sci-
entific matters. Although lawyers would accept all of
the above points as true of legal reasoning, statisti-
cal or epidemiological evidence may be admitted as
“a question of scientific fact”; and there then may
be an over-reliance on the certainty of scientific con-
clusions beyond what the scientific community itself
would expect.
In practice, however, it is the statement as in (a)
of an acceptable and explicitly agreed set of tests
required for a working “proof” that seems to be the
crux of allowing the legal system to use scientific as-
sertions of causality. It is from such a set of tests,
whether explicitly laid out or implicitly assumed,
that we may be able to move from the existence of
empirically observed “positive association” (without
which, of course, we would rarely have any case to
argue concerning causality) to an agreed position
that the association is causal. Before detailing such
a set of tests, we must discuss this particular as-
pect: the identification of a measure of association
between (E) and (O) in the population.
3.2 Establishing Cause Through Raised
Population Risk
Much of the discussion of Hume and Popper in the
philosophical literature also relates essentially to the
situation in which there is (potentially) a necessary
or a sole or sufficient cause; that is, when R(0) holds.
Although it is also traditional in law to consider
situations where (Eind) → (Oind) similarly follows
because of a necessary causal relationship such as
R(0) (“the arsenic was swallowed and therefore the
victim died”), in the cases of relevance to us we do
not have this absolute causation. Instead, we have
population-based outcomes, often rare, which can be
expressed as relative risks and which usually appear
to be raised above the norm by the exposure. Our
concerns are thus typically with the cases R(1) in
which there are background occurrences of the out-
come (as in the DES case) or R(2) with a number
of potential exposures which might have caused the
outcome (as in the Dalkon Shield or Wilsher cases).
It is important to describe this carefully. Even
in situations with close relationships between expo-
sure and outcome, there are some ideopathic cases;
and in situations in which there is a weaker associ-
ation, such as the occurrence of cancers which may
or may not be caused by radiation, there will be
many population outcomes occurring without any
radiation exposure. To be specific, if we have (say)
1000 people totally unexposed to Epop, some num-
ber Munexp will contract the outcome; and if we have
(say) 1000 people, all exposed to Epop, some other
number Mexp will contract the outcome. We would
then measure the relative risk in this population
by RR = (expected rate of exposure per exposed
person)/(expected rate of outcome per unexposed
person) = Mexp/Munexp. For example, if in observ-
ing a population we find there are 25 lung cancers
annually per 1000 persons exposed to asbestos, com-
pared to 5 lung cancers annually per 1000 persons
not exposed to asbestos, then there will be a value
for RR of 5.0. This means that on average, an ex-
posed individual is five times as likely as an unex-
posed individual to suffer the outcome.
In case-control studies of rare outcomes the rel-
ative risk is adequately approximated by the odds
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ratio, expressed as the ratio of expected rates of ex-
posure for exposed (case) and unexposed (control)
subjects. Other measures, such as excess risk, stan-
dardized differences and mortality ratios may also
be used. Complementary descriptions are also avail-
able, such as the “probability that a case is due to
the exposure” PDE = (RR – 1)/RR [20]. Thus a RR
of 5 in the above scenario is equivalent to a proba-
bility of 0.8 that “the case is due to the exposure.”
If RR = 1 (or OR = 1 or PDE = 0), then clearly
there is no relationship between Epop and Opop. If
we can prove that RR > 1, then at least some of
the outcomes in the population are associated with
Epop. However, it is important to remind ourselves
that these are primarily measures of association (de-
spite the wording “is due to” in the definition of
PDE) and, as we discuss in Section 3.3, it may take
further steps to assert general or population-based
causation.
As the Courts determine civil matters on the bal-
ance of probabilities, a RR> 2.0 or PDE> 0.5 is as
a rule of thumb indicative of causation. Proof on the
balance of probabilities, as required by civil courts,
is sometimes called the “51% rule” [17], which states
that if there is more than a 50% chance of the out-
come being causal, it is to be treated as causal. If
we accept a causal link in the population, the appar-
ent interpretation of a relative risk above 2.0 sug-
gests that more than 50% of the outcomes (Opop)
are caused by the exposure of interest (Epop) and
less than 50% are due to other causes.
This rule has been the subject of considerable dis-
cussion and criticism. For example, since the rule is
based on an estimate (rather than the true RR), it
has been argued that it may be more appropriate
to use the corresponding lower 95% confidence level
(LCL) and require the more stringent test that this
LCL must be above 2.0. In a different vein, Green-
land [22] argues that it is important to understand
the nature of the relationship between the exposure
and the outcome before making such a rule: at the
point at which the probability exceeds 50%, the ex-
posure level may be well below that at which the in-
cidence of disease is doubled. Maldonado and Green-
land [42] and Greenland and Robins [23] point to the
phenomenon of “accelerated outcome” (some of the
outcomes in the exposed group would have occurred
later anyway had the individual not been exposed)
in biasing the relative risk in favor of the defendant.
Although an exposure may accelerate the contrac-
tion of a disease, it does not necessarily cause the
disease, because the individual was “doomed,” the
contraction of the disease was inevitable.
The RR> 2 rule has also been discussed in light
of bias arising from shortcomings in the epidemio-
logical study. Carruth and Goldstein [4] argue that
overestimation might occur through the “incomplete
accrual” problem, in which statistically significant
associations observed in large epidemiological stud-
ies are published before all the cases of disease have
accrued. Alternatively, underestimation might occur
through the “healthy worker effect” if the epidemi-
ological study targets a work force that is generally
healthier than the general population. Moreover, if
a raised RR is observed, “remedial action” may be
taken to reduce the exposure, leading to lower RR
estimates in subsequent studies.
It is apparent that using an overall relative risk
of 2.0, say, as a cutoff point for all individuals in a
given population is likely to be unpalatable in both
scientific and legal contexts. However, in practice
such a risk is, in almost all cases, a mixture of risks:
there will be subgroups of individuals whose relative
risk is well above (and well below) the average. By
finding where the individual plaintiff lies in this mix-
ture, it may be generally much easier to ensure that
those almost certainly suffering because of the ex-
posure are recompensed and those almost certainly
suffering due to background or other causes are not
recompensed. If we are able to use the actual ex-
posure level and other factors to identify a relevant
subgroup to which the individual belongs, then it is
clear that the harshness of the “balance of proba-
bilities” rule as an all-or-nothing approach is very
substantially softened.
Of course, caution should be exercised in applying
the 51% rule in other contexts. For example, from a
public policy perspective, it would seem unreason-
able to allow society to be subjected to an exposure
that produced a relative risk within the range 1.5 to
1.9 [20, 78]. As discussed at the start of Section 3,
recent reforms in the law of negligence have given
courts the ability to use policy as a determinative
factor when considering causation, so that the de-
fendant may be liable for negligence even though the
RR> 2 rule is failed and scientific proof of causality
is not established.
3.3 Establishing Cause in a Relevant Population
The first of the subtests in the two-step proce-
dures defined in Section 2.5 is satisfied if the epi-
demiological study proves that, more probably than
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not, there is an association between the exposure
and the outcome in the population. If the exposure,
whether due to negligent or other acts on the part
of the defendant, has not been satisfactorily shown
to be causally linked to the claimed outcome in the
population and exposure category to which an indi-
vidual belongs, then there is no case to argue based
on population data.
As discussed above, such a debate may well in-
volve the vital and often poorly handled question
of using a relevant estimate of relative risk for the
specific individual in question.
Relative risks are designed to quantify the ex-
cess outcomes that can meaningfully be ascribed to
the exposure (E) within a whole population. But if
there are other risk factors for (O) that are known,
then the contribution of (E) should be measured for
the relevant subgroups of populations or adjustment
made for the other factors in the analysis. Such risk
factors may be quite neutral from a legal point of
view. The most obvious is age: exposure of an old
person to a drug may change risk levels in quite dif-
ferent ways than does exposure of a younger person.
They may be more contentious: asbestos exposure
for smokers raises relative risk of lung cancer far
more than for nonsmokers, and for any plaintiff the
correct joint exposure should clearly be determined
if possible.
The importance of identifying a suitable refer-
ence population is underlined by the various para-
doxes that may arise if appropriate account is not
taken of confounders. For example, Simpson’s para-
dox [45] shows that a smaller relative risk estimate
may be observed after the combination of groups
with higher individual relative risks. Slud and Byar
[59] provide further discussion of this phenomenon.
Adjustment for special circumstances is often done
in a general way for whole populations. But here we
face the question of assessing the increased risk of an
outcome (O) from exposure (E) for a single plain-
tiff, and we may know a considerable amount about
other risk factors for this individual or group of in-
dividuals.
Thus we must either:
(a) estimate the risk relative to a population of
persons similar with respect to other risk factors, or
(b) assume that those other factors are effectively
neutral, that is, that the relative risk appropriate to
the plaintiff is the same as for any other person in
the population.
The latter will often be demonstrably implausible
to some degree, but it is in general a scientific impos-
sibility to estimate risk for a very detailed subgroup
of the population (e.g., those women of age 40 with
three life-time sexual partners, use of an IUD for
6 months at the age of 27, and a family history of
infertility; or those men aged 70, with 4 months in
an asbestos mill, but not in the “dusty” part, and
who smoked for 15 years but only using a filter, and
who had worked as plumbers with exposure to var-
ious documented carcinogens for 30 years). Even at
a less detailed level there may be limited informa-
tion. For example, although there is substantial data
about the relative risks of PID associated with IUD
use, promiscuity (which can be a confounding and
possibly causal factor) can be poorly documented,
so that the relevant subpopulation may be difficult
to define for an individual; or cross-classification of
smoking and asbestos may not be precise, since as-
bestos could typically be very poorly measured.
It is understood by the courts that the level of
exposure, both of the plaintiff and of the reference
population, is not always available and while such
would be beneficial, it is not necessary to demon-
strate a substance is toxic to humans given sub-
stantial exposure [104]. If the plaintiff comes from
a population with high exposure and a precisely es-
timated relative risk of 20.0, this may well indicate a
convincingly causal association, whereas a plaintiff
with low exposure coming from a population with a
relative risk of 1.01 will have less grounds for such
a conclusion.
This then raises the problem of measurement in
the population and for the individual. Evaluation of
the effects of asbestos provides a good example of
many of these problems. For example, it may not
be in contention that asbestos in the air results in
some level of exposure to asbestos in the lungs of
workers. But measuring the level of exposure in a
population is notoriously difficult; see, for example,
[34, 71], where different methods of measurement
led to different conclusions on the same population.
This is then exacerbated because we rarely have di-
rect measurement of exposure in the lungs in the
individual plaintiff, so the level of exposure of the
plaintiff in a given case may be a matter of statisti-
cal estimation.
Of course, population studies cannot always be
conducted at the level of detail desired to give re-
sults for a population relevant to a specific plaintiff,
and if they are, numbers in the studies are almost
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bound to be so small that other aspects such as lack
of statistical significance, accuracy of data and rep-
resentativeness of the sample tend to render results
open to criticism.
These considerations all highlight the need for ac-
curate and detailed data, which is obviously well rec-
ognized by both scientists and lawyers. While both
parties would accept that better quality data pro-
vide more reliable conclusions, courts may find dif-
ficulty in using epidemiological results since poor
quality data, even though it may be indicative in
the scientific arena of certain relationships, may be
quite unconvincing under the scrutiny of the adver-
sarial system.
Despite all of these difficulties, and even if a com-
pletely relevant population cannot be identified,
statisticians can generally provide the court with
some partial answers based on population data: the
relative contribution of other risk factors (e.g.,
whether the number of sexual partners is important
to the outcome of PID and if so, to what degree), rel-
evant population subgroups (e.g., cohorts in which
the RR is reasonably stable), a model which de-
scribes the individual outcome in terms of a range of
factors or quantification of the effect of poor quality
studies.
It rests with the court to determine, with guidance
from the scientists, just how the individual fits into
the relevant population, and consequently how much
compromise can be borne in the assessment of the
individual plaintiff.
3.4 A Test-Based Framework for Scientific Proof
of General Causation
The approach we outline here brings together prag-
matic tests through which, if passed to a “satisfac-
tory” degree, causality may be deemed proven: if
failed, then causality is still unproven. The use of a
test-based approach seems to fit much of the think-
ing in both the scientific and the legal arenas, and
perhaps forms one area of agreement between them
when so many other aspects are different.
One of the most commonly used set of tests in
the epidemiological context is generally attributed
to Bradford Hill [30], which appears with modifica-
tions in many places (see, e.g., [54, 55]). Other recent
approaches in the area of clinical medicine include
Breslow and Day [3] and Chalmers [6].
Based on this literature, we list below ten tests
which are relevant to asserting general or population-
based causality. We spell these out in much more
detail in the Appendix.
Test 1 (Existence of mechanism). Is the pro-
posed association explained by a biologically plausi-
ble mechanism?
This is not always a reasonable question given cur-
rent scientific knowledge, and if failed we might turn
to
Test 2 (Analogous relationships). Is the pro-
posed association analogous to some other accepted
causal association?
There must be at least some reason for believing
that the exposure should give the outcome.
Test 3 (Temporality). Does the exposure pre-
cede the outcome?
This is obvious at first, but in many epidemio-
logical situations the latency of the disease must be
taken into account and the time of onset of disease
may be indeterminate.
Test 4 (Validity of data). Are the data, on which
the conclusion is based, valid?
Mistakes, systematic biases and other errors in the
study design, data collection and data entry must be
ruled out.
Test 5 (Strength of association). Is the observed
association strong, as measured, for example, by a
RR substantially greater than 1.0?
Regardless of whether it supports a real negative
effect or is simply ambivalent about the effect due
to small sample size, a RR less than 1.0 cannot lend
support to a claim of causation.
Test 6 (Lack of confounders). Are there other
aspects of the study group that might explain the ob-
served association?
As described in Section 2.4, there are often many
other factors that must be ruled out as potential
confounders or explanations of an observed associa-
tion.
Test 7 (Consistency of association). Is the as-
sociation consistently found over a number of stud-
ies?
This conforms to the usual scientific principle of
repeatability and provides robustness to the causal
claim. There are reasons why such consistency may
not be found, but these must be clearly established
if this test is to be discounted.
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Test 8 (Statistical significance). Is the observed
association statistically significant?
This is central. In scientific reasoning the proba-
bility that an observed positive association is due to
chance fluctuation or “background causes” must be
satisfactorily small.
Test 9 (Dose-response relationship). Is there an
increase in magnitude of outcome from an increas-
ing level of exposure?
This is particularly important for assessing sub-
groups within a population and for considering indi-
vidual causation, in particular evaluating the effect
of exposure at the level experienced by the individ-
ual.
Test 10 (Validity of logic). Is the conclusion ac-
tually justified by the data and analysis presented?
This appears obvious, but optimistic (or pessimis-
tic) generalizations and extrapolations of the results
of an analysis are common.
Before a strong case for (Epop)→ (Opop) can be
made, we would argue that each of these tests needs
to be considered. In some cases there may be a rea-
sonable explanation why they might fail (as is the
case in many of the examples we have proposed; see
the Appendix for more detail); but unless they are
considered appropriately, we believe that it is not
possible to make a serious case that, in the popula-
tion, (Epop)→ (Opop) has been proven.
3.5 Admissibility of Epidemiological Studies into
Evidence
We turn now to the question of when epidemio-
logical studies and the corresponding explanations
by epidemiologists are admissible as evidence. Typi-
cally, such a study can be admitted into evidence as
an expert opinion. Preconditions differ among the
United States, United Kingdom and Australia, but
there are some common themes among these juris-
dictions.
All of the jurisdictions require that for any evi-
dence to be admissible, it must be relevant to the
issues contested in the litigation. In Australia, s55 of
the Evidence Act (Cth) [76] provides that evidence
is relevant if it
“could rationally affect (directly or indi-
rectly) the assessment of the probability of
the existence of a fact in issue in the pro-
ceeding.”
In the United States rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence [77] provides that expert evidence must
be relevant such that it has a valid scientific con-
nection to the pertinent inquiry. An epidemiological
study will satisfy the test of relevance given it ex-
amines the relationship between the particular ex-
posure and the particular outcome that is the basis
for the case.
The more important issue is whether the methods
used in the epidemiological study have an underly-
ing foundation capable of forming the basis for an
expert opinion. The United States has given more
consideration to this issue than the other jurisdic-
tions. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence [77]
provides that there must be reliability in the meth-
ods used by the expert and reliability in the ap-
plication of these methods to the facts in the case.
Daubert [85], Joiner [90] and Kumho Tires [95] are
known as the “trilogy” and are the leading authori-
ties on this point of reliability of the expert’s opin-
ion.
Daubert [85] provided that the test of reliabil-
ity of expert opinion is a “flexible one” and that
the trial court is to act as “gatekeeper” in apply-
ing this test. However, Daubert emphasized that the
main concern is the reliability of the scientific meth-
ods, not the conclusions that they draw. The court
then set out a nonexhaustive list of four factors
to consider when determining whether the scientific
method used by the expert is reliable: whether the
expert’s method has been tested; whether the ex-
pert’s method was the subject of peer review or pub-
lication; whether the expert’s method has a known
or potential rate of error and standards controlling
the method’s operation; and whether the expert’s
method has general acceptance within the relevant
scientific community.
The later decision of Kumho Tires [95] provided
that these four factors may be given consideration
by the court, but they are by no means strict re-
quirements. Rather, the primary consideration for
the court is whether the expert’s opinion is of “the
same level of intellectual rigor” as the expert would
employ outside the courtroom when working in his
or her relevant discipline.
The object of the “intellectual rigor test” is to
prevent the expert reaching an opinion that is tai-
lored for the purposes of litigation. As pointed out
in Joiner [90], the expert must account for “how
and why” he or she reached his/her opinion [2]. As
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Berger [2] writes, experts must show that their con-
clusions were reached by methods that are consis-
tent with how their colleagues would proceed were
they presented with the same facts and issues. So
while a scientific expert can depart from canonical
methods, he or she must then show grounds consis-
tent with the methods of the scientific community
that support the departure [83].
In Australia, for an expert opinion to be admis-
sible it must be derived from methods that are ac-
cepted by the field of expertise [29]. While the High
Court itself has not ruled on this, it does appear
likely that the courts will use the criterion of gen-
eral acceptance within the professional community,
which has been rejected in the United States [18].
The court does, however, have a wide discretion to
reject expert opinion evidence that does satisfy the
general acceptance criterion, but is unreliable; see
ss135–137 Evidence Act (Cth) [76].
The United Kingdom also bases admissibility of
expert opinion evidence upon the general acceptance
criterion [18]. Furthermore, reliability was held not
to constitute a criterion for admissibility [98].
4. ESTABLISHING INDIVIDUAL OR SPECIFIC
CAUSATION
Supposing now that (Epop) is accepted as causal
for (Opop) in a relevant population. Following Sec-
tion 2.5, we must now consider whether the exposure
is causal of the actual plaintiff’s outcome, since in all
of the situations under R(1) or R(2), some outcomes
in the population are not due to (Epop).
When an association between (Epop) and (Opop)
is so established as causal through a test-based sta-
tistical procedure such as described in Section 3.4,
it can then be used to establish the individual level
of the causal chain (Eind)→ (Oind) by the normal
legal tests.
In order to avoid complexities, let us for the mo-
ment assume that there is one plaintiff who has suc-
cessfully established that
(a) the plaintiff suffers from the compensable out-
come (Oind);
(b) there is an exposure (Eind) which is sufficiently
well defined to enable one to consider whether (Eind)
actually caused (Oind) in the plaintiff;
(c) there is an action (A) performed by the de-
fendant resulting in the exposure (Eind) which was
in breach of a duty of care owed to the plaintiff.
The legal test to be applied for causation is now
prescribed by legislation in Australia. It is provided
for under the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) [75] that
for a breach of duty to cause a particular harm, the
following elements must be satisfied:
(a) the breach of duty was a necessary condition
of the occurrence of the harm (“factual causation”);
(b) it is appropriate for the scope of the liability
of the person in breach to extend to the harm so
caused (“scope of liability”).
The scope of liability under (b) is typically a ques-
tion of law for the judge. We concern ourselves here
with factual causation under (a). What constitutes
a necessary condition in (a) is dependent upon the
nature of the exposure and is considered in Sections
4.1 and 4.2.
4.1 Simple Cases—Single Cause
A simple case is akin to the situation R(0) de-
scribed in Section 2.2, where there is only one pos-
sible exposure under consideration. In these cases,
factual causation is proven if the exposure is the
necessary condition of the outcome. In Australia,
March v Stramare [96] provided that the approach
of the Common Law toward causation in cases in-
volving a single cause of the plaintiff’s harm is to
apply what is known as the “but for” test.
The but for test. “But for” the exposure,
would the outcome have occurred on the balance of
probabilities?
It is useful to note that the “But for” test has
more than one function. When considering causative
issues, the test can also be used in the negative sense.
InMarch v Stramare [96] it was used to eliminate, as
potential causes, those acts which have no relevance
to the occurrence of the plaintiff’s harm.
Some American case law has suggested that the
balance of probabilities standard for an individual
can be satisfied by establishing a relative risk greater
than 2.0 in the population from which that individ-
ual is drawn. However, there is equal authority for
the proposition that a relative risk greater than 2.0
is not a strict requirement of causation; see Car-
ruth and Goldstein [4] for a discussion of the cases
supporting the alternative views. Re Joint Eastern
and Southern District Asbestos Litigation [99] found
that if the relative risk failed to reach 2.0, then the
epidemiological evidence in combination with other
evidence which eliminates confounding factors and
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strengthens the association specifically in the cir-
cumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s case, can es-
tablish causation.
In Australia, Seltsam [100], at paragraph 136, ex-
plained that the predominant position seems to be
that the balance of probabilities test requires a court
to reach a level of actual persuasion, which is not a
mechanical application of probabilities. Actual per-
suasion does not require that a relative risk of 2.0
be reached, even where that is the only evidence put
forth. Spigelman, at paragraph 137 [100], speaks of
sources of evidence in tortuous claims as “strands in
the cable,” not “links in the chain.” The sources of
evidence, being strands in the cable, must be capa-
ble of bearing the weight of the inference made, so
that one source of evidence alone, or many sources
combined, may be capable of establishing causation.
At paragraph 89 [100] Spigelman provided that
epidemiological evidence, either alone or in combina-
tion with other evidence, is capable of satisfying the
balance of probabilities standard and thus establish-
ing specific causation for an individual. His Honour
[100] also said at paragraph 29 that further evidence
will almost certainly be required where the quality of
the epidemiological evidence and the strength of the
association are poor. For example, in Seltsam [100]
it was argued by the plaintiff that asbestos caused
renal cell carcinoma even though the relative risk
was less than 2.0. It was held [100], at paragraph
171, that it was not enough that the epidemiolog-
ical evidence only established that asbestos could
reach the kidney; there needed to be some evidence
that the asbestos did reach the kidney in this indi-
vidual case. Relevant medical evidence was required
at this step to establish causation: “The strength of
the association between asbestos exposure and re-
nal cell carcinoma, and other aspects of the quality
of the epidemiological research, particularly incon-
sistencies amongst the various studies, were relevant
considerations which his Honour was obliged to take
into account” (at paragraph 32).
4.2 Exceptional Cases—Multiple Causes
The “but for” test is not always appropriate, such
as in an “exceptional case” in which there are mul-
tiple or complex causes of the harm generally oper-
ating simultaneously [44] or each capable of causing
the harm [5].
The Courts have primarily applied the “material
contribution” test to determine factual causation in
the exceptional case. Causation is asserted if, on the
balance of probabilities, the wrongful act or omis-
sion materially contributed to the harm [82]. If the
material contribution test is satisfied, then the breach
of duty should be accepted as being a necessary con-
dition of the harm and thus the “factual causation”
element provided for in s11(1)(a) CLA [75] would be
satisfied.
Material contribution test. On the balance
of probabilities, did the exposure contribute to the in-
dividual’s harm to a material extent?
Determining when the Material Contribution test
is satisfied seems to be a difficult question, especially
when causation for an individual is being based on
results from population studies.
Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [82] defined
material contribution as a contribution which does
not fall within the category of de minimis non cu-
rat lex. That is, for a contribution to be material
it must be more than minute or insignificant [47].
Chappel v Hart [84] proposes that a mere possibility
is not sufficient for causation; rather, the increased
risk must cause or materially contribute to the harm
actually suffered. Chief Justice Spigelman in Seltsam
Pty Ltd v McGuiness & Anor [100] went further in
describing material contribution as “the ‘possibility’
or ‘risk’ that X might cause Y had in fact eventu-
ated, not in the sense that X happened and Y had
also happened, but that it was undisputed that Y
had happened because of X” (at paragraph 119).
Hence, there must be more than a chance that
the exposure resulted in the harm; there needs to
be some certainty that the harm was the result of
the exposure.
With respect to the level of certainty required,
Denzin & Ors v Nutrasweet & Ors [87] provided
that there must be a “probable connection” between
the exposure and the harm. Material contribution
requires that the exposure must be “the cause” or
“a probable cause” of the harm [87]. Therefore, al-
though material contribution may not require that
the relative risk in the relevant population be above
2.0, it does seem to require that statistically the ex-
posure significantly increases the risk of harm [87].
So, a mere increase in the risk of harm, as opposed
to a statistically significant increase, should then
not suffice. However, McGhee v National Coal Board
[97] substituted “materially increasing the risk” for
“material contribution” and this has led to some
confusion. In Hotson [92], material contribution on
the balance of probabilities required that the risk of
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harm be more than 50%. In Wilsher [105], the fact
that the court was asked to decide between com-
peting rather than reinforcing risks seemed to be a
sticking point even though there were five exposures
which all raised the risk of harm, if not materially
contributing to it.
The recent decision of Fairchild v Glenhoven Fu-
neral Services Ltd [89] has given some clarity to the
ambiguities brought about by these cases. Fairchild
[89] is a case regarding the liability of employers
for exposing their employees to asbestos. Because
the mechanism by which asbestos fibers precipitate
mesothelioma is unknown, the consequences that
would follow had it not been for the fault of any one
of a number of exposures, such as environmental ex-
posures, is also unknown. Because of the unknown
etiology of the harm, the plaintiff cannot prove that
the harm was more likely than not caused by the
defendant’s negligence rather than background ex-
posures. As a result, it is impossible to tell exactly
which exposure materially contributed the harm so
as to have so caused the harm. Despite the problems
posed, the House of Lords found that causation had
been established and in doing so gave commentary
on past decisions.
The major determination made by the House of
Lords in Fairchild [89] was to confirm the decision
made inMcGhee [97]. Establishing causation through
the simple raising of the risk of harm is to only apply
in certain circumstances, so as to work as an excep-
tion to the orthodox approach to causation of the ex-
posure materially contributing to the harm. This ex-
ception is referred to as the McGhee/Fairchild prin-
ciple. There are no prescribed requirements to be
met in order for this principle to be applied. Rather,
a case-by-case approach is to be taken, and Staple-
ton [63] believes that for the time being there will be
some uncertainty as to when the McGhee/Fairchild
principle will be applied.
Nevertheless, from the relevant cases, two impor-
tant requirements can be established: that the etiol-
ogy of the outcome is unknown, and that the defen-
dant’s conduct hadmaterially contributed to the risk
that the plaintiff would succumb to the outcome.
There are, of course, more requirements to be met,
because otherwise the courts would be subjected to
a flood of claims brought under the principle. What
constitutes these other requirements is uncertain at
present, but some factors emerge.
One such factor clarifies why no causation was es-
tablished in Wilsher [105] despite several exposures
materially increasing the risk. This is that there
should only be a single type of agent/exposure; as
suggested by Stapleton [63], this does not mean that
there cannot be more than one agent present, but
that agents must all operate in substantially the
same way. For example, a person exposed by two
neighboring asbestos plants would not be prevented
from the application of the McGhee/Fairchild prin-
ciple because the two agents are working in the same
way. On the basis of this requirement, the decision
in Wilsher [105] was correct in not applying the
McGhee/Fairchild principle. Stapleton [63] provides
that in Wilsher the evidentiary gap was too wide to
leap because there were five agents operating in sub-
stantially different manners. The decision inWilsher
was not actually creating ambiguity, but rather con-
forming with the decisions of previous cases; conse-
quently, Fairchild approved Wilsher.
It is now easy to distinguish Hotson [92] from
cases such as McGhee [97], Wilsher [105] and Fair-
child [89]. Hotson provided that exposure upon which
the liability is being placed needs to be responsible
for more than 50% of the contribution. This only ap-
plies, however, if the liability can be quantified with
at least some certainty. In contrast, where statistical
quantification in the individual is impossible, for ex-
ample where the etiology is unknown, then all that
is required is evidence that the exposure materially
increased the risk.
As the facts of the case vary, so do the require-
ments of the material contribution test. Generally
the Material Contribution test will require that the
exposure materially contributed to the harm. How-
ever, where there is a gap in the evidence such that
it is impossible to determine whether the exposure
caused the harm, then all that will be required for
causation is to prove that the exposure materially
increased the risk of the harm.
Material contribution test (where there is
an evidentiary gap). On the balance of probabili-
ties, did the exposure increase the relative risk for
the individual to a material extent?
Where there is an evidentiary gap, the onus on
the plaintiff to prove factual causation is less strin-
gent than where there is no gap. Nevertheless, it was
expressed in the Ipp Report [37] at paragraph 7.32
that where there is a gap in the evidence, the deci-
sion must still be “widely considered to be fair and
reasonable.”
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4.3 Allocation of Responsibility
Where there are multiple exposures which may
have caused an outcome, and where more than one
might be compensable, allocation of responsibility
becomes an issue.
This is rarely simple. Consider a plaintiff who has
had joint exposure to asbestos and active smoking of
tobacco. Population studies [25] show relative risks
of lung cancer (O) associated with exposure to as-
bestos given (approximately) by (RRa) = 6.0, with
active smoking by (RRs) = 11.0, and with exposure
to both asbestos and smoking by (RRas) = 51.0. If
all the causal implications are accepted and a rel-
evant subgroup is identified (and we cannot stress
too often that these are necessary precursors), then
for every random 65 persons with outcome O who
were jointly exposed, 5 of the outcomes were due
to asbestos, 10 were due to cigarettes and 50 were
due to the interaction of the two exposures; that
is, 55/65 in some sense were contributed to by as-
bestos. Thus the action of asbestos, for smokers, is
to increase the risk far more than it would in the
normal population.
How should the courts handle such material con-
tributions, where there is more than one exposure
that could be involved in an individual case? The
first instance judgment in Hotson [92] was to pro-
rate the damages by the assessed risks involved; but
this was overturned. On this basis, an interpretation
of the “contribution” to the outcome from asbestos
exposure would be to decide that all of the asbestos
risk, including that for all of the interactively caused
outcome, is due to asbestos; that is (ignoring for the
moment all other issues such as contributory negli-
gence), since 55/65 leads to a RR greater than 2.0,
to award against a defendant who exposed workers
to asbestos on a causal argument. But one could ar-
gue equally that smoking exposure was responsible
for 60/65 of the raised risk in the population.
Legally, the situation may have nothing to do with
any comparison of the size of relative risks involved;
it may well depend rather on who owes the duty
to the plaintiff. An asbestos employer, for example,
may have a duty to provide a safe place of work, but
must take his employees as they present themselves;
and it could then be argued that observation of this
duty is (as shown by the relative risks above) rather
more vital for smokers than for nonsmokers.
It is of course tempting, nonetheless, to try and
find a formula-based method of allocation of the in-
teraction risk based on the two assumed contribu-
tors. For example, Chase, Kotin, Crump and Mitchell
[7] advocate that the interaction term RRas = 50
should be prorated in some way. This methodology is
superficially attractive, but the actual computations
of Chase et al. essentially revert to using an addi-
tive model, which in the asbestos/smoking situation
(and many others) ignores any synergy involved in
the different exposures.
The establishment of an appropriate biological mo-
del for the nature of the interaction between multi-
ple exposures is paramount in these circumstances.
Epidemiology can play some role in this (see, e.g.,
[72]), but as Robins and Greenland [50] point out,
estimation of these interactions is in general very
difficult. Unlike Chase et al., Robins and Green-
land conclude that it is the role of the courts, not
the statisticians, to decide on the contributions of
competing risks in such contexts. Unfortunately, in
McGhee [97] and Fairchild [89] the issue of appor-
tionment was not raised by the defense nor given
any consideration by the courts. Hence it remains
uncertain as to whether the defendant can be liable
for only a proportion of the plaintiff’s harm on the
basis that there are other exposures contributing to
the risk.
Issues of allocation of responsibility also arise where
the plaintiff is exposed to a single agent to which
several parties have contributed. This is an issue
under current debate, but there are several Aus-
tralian decisions regarding apportionment between
tortfeasors. E M Baldwin & Son Pty Ltd v Plane [88]
approved equal apportionment between tortfeasors.
However, this decision has been criticized and not
yet been followed. Rather, the courts are taking the
view that apportionment does not have to be equal.
In James Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd v Roberts [94], a
recent asbestos related case, Sheller refused to de-
clare equal apportionment where successive employ-
ers had exposed the plaintiff to asbestos for different
periods, with different intensities of exposure to as-
bestos with different toxicity. Support of this latter
view has been found in several other cases such as
Bitupave Ltd v McMahon [81] andWallaby Grip Ltd
v State Rail Authority of NSW [103].
In the United States radioepidemiologic tables that
estimate the probability of cancer developing from a
dose of radiation are used to determine the amount
of compensation awarded [36]. The probability in
the tables is obtained from the assigned share meth-
odology. The assigned share is the ratio of the excess
number of cancer cases in the exposed to the total
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number of cancer cases in the exposed [36]. Further-
more, the population is divided up into subgroups
in an attempt to make drawing an inference from
the population to the individual theoretically more
valid [36]. The assigned share methodology becomes
complex and its discussion deserves a paper of its
own.
5. USING “BARE STATISTICS”: THE
YELLOW AND BLUE TAXI ARGUMENT
Using statistical arguments for deciding on “bal-
ance of probabilities” can sit uncomfortably in the
legal situation, despite the similarities in terminol-
ogy. The use of a relative risk as described above is
specifically sanctioned for radiation associated with
cancers [27], but in other cases it may well need to be
reconciled with legal thinking even if it does in fact
describe the way in which balance of probabilities is
understood in legal cases.
The confusion about the role of statistics in the
establishment of causation is exemplified in the hy-
pothetical case (cited in [92]) of a town having three
blue and one yellow taxis operated by different com-
panies. Here, it is postulated that
(i) first, there has been an injury to an individ-
ual [the outcome (Oind)] resulting from being hit by
a taxi [the exposure (Eind)] which was driven negli-
gently [the action (A)]; and
(ii) there is no evidence in the accepted sense of
which taxi company is responsible for the action.
One might argue that, in the light of no other
evidence, there is a “75% probability” (i.e., a 3 to 1
chance) that the taxi is blue, and therefore based on
the “balance of probabilities” the action, and hence
exposure and outcome, were caused by the blue taxi
cab company.
Such reasoning using “bare” statistics was disal-
lowed by Lord Mackay in [92], largely on the grounds
of the perceived inequity to the defendant, who would
have to bear the liability for all cases; this seems un-
fair even if they are indeed responsible for 75% of
them.
How is this argument resolved in the light of our
proposed procedures for asserting causation? If we
accept the proposition that a relative risk greater
than 2.0 establishes causation on the balance of prob-
abilities, then we might appear on the face of it to
be exactly in the situation of the blue and yellow
taxis.
To resolve this, we examine the causal links in the
taxi case more carefully. The link (Eind)→ (Oind) is
well established as necessary and sufficient, fitting
into the category R(0) of Section 2.2. It is the first
link (Aind)→ (Oind) which must be established. If
we are to ascribe the probability of the outcome for
the plaintiff in the same 3:1 ratio proportional to the
number of taxis, there are two crucial assumptions
that we need to make, both of which must be tested
from the nontechnical or commonsense viewpoint.
These are that:
(a) the probability of the action (negligent driving)
is the same for each taxi;
(b) the probability of the exposure (being hit) from
each taxi is the same for the individual.
Under (a) any taxi is as likely as any other to hit the
plaintiff; under (b) the taxis to which the plaintiff is
exposed are three times as likely to be blue. This will
then give a RR greater than 2.0 of being hit by a blue
taxi, and hence give a real “balance of probabilities”
that the blue taxi has caused the accident, analogous
to the epidemiological concept of risk.
It is (b) that essentially says that we need to have
a population risk estimate to add to the “naked
statistic” of the chance of being exposed. Possibly
the only way to verify this is to use population-based
data to assure that all taxis are equally likely to be in
the neighborhood of any given person in the relevant
population, and that the taxis are all equally likely
to hit people in their vicinity. In this case in fact it is
an estimate of (A)→ (E) that is in question, rather
than (E)→ (O), but the principle is the same. In
contrast, the initial argument merely told us about
the chance of picking a taxi at random without con-
sideration of the causal links and assumptions in-
volved; it did not tell us about the chance that an
injury was caused by taking this cause proportional
to its true population level of risk.
Furthermore, the hypothesis that blue taxis cause
three times as many accidents in the population,
if subjected to the scientific methodology proposed
above, fails many other population-based tests for
establishing causality. There is no information given
about Tests 4 to 9 described in the Appendix, in
particular covering issues of validity of data, other
confounders, repetition, exposure-response and sta-
tistical significance. In effect, there is no underlying
proof of (Apop)→ (Opop) and no corresponding in-
formation about (Aind)→ (Oind), and this seems to
be why scientific methodology, the legal reasoning
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of Lord Mackay in [92] and common sense all stand
together to reject the hypothetical claim.
This is still not quite analogous to using epidemio-
logical risks. It may be helpful to extend the descrip-
tion to a more relevant one. Suppose that statistics
on traffic accidents caused by taxis had been kept
for, say, twelve months, and that for each such acci-
dent we had recorded the color of the taxi. Further-
more, suppose that in this situation, three times as
many people had indeed been hit through negligent
driving by the blue taxis compared with the yellow
taxi.
Are we then prepared to accept that the blue taxis
are, on the balance of probabilities, responsible for
the single accident we have observed?
We need to make several assumptions again for
this to be valid. We need (a) above, still. For sup-
pose, to the contrary, that by a licensing arrange-
ment the only taxis allowed in this area were yel-
low; obviously we would change our views. We need
to be satisfied that the same drivers, or mechanics,
were still driving and maintaining the taxis so that
circumstances in our case were still similar to those
where the data had been collected, and that the pop-
ulation was still relevant to the plaintiff. Would the
courts now find against the blue taxi cab company?
Perhaps not. Certainly, in the absence of such ex-
ternal evidence, both the assumptions (a) and (b)
seem inherently unreasonable and indeed manifestly
unfair. But regardless of their equity, the underly-
ing statistical reason to reject the initial argument
is because it is based on the wrong set of probabil-
ities: it argues on the probability of the taxis being
chosen at random, rather than on the relative occur-
rence of actions and exposures leading to outcomes,
which (without these assumptions) may be totally
different.
Thus our suggested use of relative risks in Section
4 is a different situation to that of the taxis, and
it appears to encapsulate the question of arguing
from the general population to individual balances
of probability.
6. CONCLUSIONS
There are marked similarities between statistical
and legal thinking concerning the onus of proof in
establishing causality of a relationship.
In statistical or scientific arenas, the onus of proof
is essentially on the scientist to show that a relation-
ship between exposure and outcome is causal. The
initial working assumption in the scientific method
is indeed that no relationship, much less a causal re-
lationship, holds. Unless the data, the theories and
the inferences disprove this assumption and thereby
establish causality, then the initial assumption re-
mains unrefuted.
At the population level, we have given one set of
tests for establishing (at least at a working level) a
standard of scientific proof which might be accepted
in legal cases in discharging this onus of proof.
This approach is often made quite explicit in com-
mon systems of statistical inference, where a so-
called null hypothesis, that there is no relationship
(causal or otherwise) between the exposure and the
outcomes, is actually formalized. It is precisely be-
cause this must be falsified that the test for statis-
tical significance is set in the way it is, especially in
comparison to balance of probability arguments. A
statistician is not convinced of the existence of a re-
lationship by the mere 50% chance that the result is
not random; by convention a more than 95% chance
of the outcome being unexplained by random events,
or a more stringent level of, say, 99% or 99.9% (or
even in some cases a more lenient level of, say, 80%)
is required before it is accepted that this aspect of
the onus of proof has been discharged.
However, mere discounting of random events as
an alternative explanation by demonstrating statis-
tical significance is only one (albeit a central) part of
the test-based approach. Discounting other possible
explanations is also critical.
We have argued that these scientific tests are cru-
cial, but incomplete input to any legal tests for cau-
sation. In terms of the causal chain, they may es-
tablish the fact that population risk of the outcome
in question is causally raised by exposure; the other
input needed is a method of arguing from the cau-
sation of risk for a population to causation of actual
outcome for an individual.
We have considered whether the term “balance of
probabilities” can fruitfully be equated with the sci-
entific calculation of “relative risk greater than 2.0,”
based on the establishment of a relevant population,
the use of the estimate of the lower confidence bound
as a more stringent estimate of the excess risk in
such cases, and the role of other evidence in provid-
ing this individual risk.
This is not to be confused with the different ap-
proach that might be taken for policy decisions. Be-
cause of the potential harm from waiting for asso-
ciations to be scientifically proven, it can be argued
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that in implementing a policy of prudent avoidance
of suspected but unproven risks, the onus of proof
should at times be reversed [17]. Thus if there is ei-
ther a theory, or a set of preliminary data, suggest-
ing a harmful relationship by, for example, showing
a value of RR > 1, it may be appropriate in that
arena to initially accept this relationship and act ac-
cordingly, and to abandon it only when or if the re-
lationship is falsified. There have been some notable
examples (the relationship of caffeine and pancre-
atic cancer [41] or the relationship of cadmium and
prostate cancer [11]) where initial indications were
overturned as more studies were carried out. The
full range of tests in Section 3 above would not have
yielded a proof of causation in such studies.
Similarly, in the legal context the onus of proof
is supposed to be on the plaintiff. This is certainly
the basis for the decision in Wilsher [105], in which
it was held that it was not the task of the defense
to show that one of the other risk factors was re-
sponsible, but rather the task of the prosecution to
show that the defendant was responsible. Legislation
in Australia has provided for this (see in particular
s12 CLA [75]), but Shorey v PT Ltd [101] has sug-
gested that the onus can shift to the defendant to
disprove the plaintiff’s case. Nevertheless, the plain-
tiff must prove causation in the relevant population,
by first passing the tests described in Section 3 to
a satisfactory level. To obtain a judgment on the
balance of probabilities on an individual, the plain-
tiff must then show that the population rates are
applicable to the individual, either for EC alone (in
which case the but for test is passed) or over a set of
exposures to which EC has a material contribution
(in which case the test of material contribution is
passed). Nonetheless, a raised RR may still not es-
tablish causation in the legal sense if common sense
suggests otherwise, or in the statistical sense as dis-
cussed in Section 4.
Given all of these issues, it is perhaps inevitable
that the statistical viewpoint will often aid the de-
fendant more than the plaintiff. It can aid the court
in understanding the validity or invalidity of a sta-
tistical argument, the support or otherwise of data
for a particular case, the responsibility of random-
ness of observational studies for observed population
results, and the identification of individual risks and
assessment of risk for subgroups with similar char-
acteristics to the individual in question. Good sta-
tistical analysis should give the court a better idea
of the risks in the population.
Although all the contributing exposures, includ-
ing nontortious background exposures, are relevant
when considering causation, there is somewhat of
an exception to this. A principle of law, the Eggshell
Skull Principle, provides that a victim must be taken
as he or she is found by the negligent defendant.
Consequently, if the plaintiff is more susceptible to
harm because of an inherent weakness or disorder,
the defendant cannot argue that the exposure was
trivial and that it would be unfair to burden him or
her with the liability, nor does it render the dam-
age unforeseeable [101]. The same onus of proof ap-
plies such that the plaintiff must prove that the de-
fendant’s negligence caused the harm. Causation is
proven in the same fashion as in any other negli-
gence claim. In Shorey v PT Ltd [101] it was pro-
vided that if the defendant is to escape liability, he
or she must prove that another causative exposure
had taken over as the effective cause of the plaintiff’s
damage.
Statistical analysis can never identify the cause
of a single plaintiff’s outcome unerringly ; it cannot
help if a court uses Stapleton’s standard of “. . . the
production of a latent bodily condition certain to
produce disabling personal injuries in the future”
[62]. Nor can statistical analysis generally help with
the question of negligence, that is, the step (A)→
(E) in our causal chain, but the introduction of the
CLA [75] may lead to statistics having a part to play
in this step. Before the recent reforms, the risk of
harm being found by the courts as reasonably fore-
seeable (i.e., the question of whether an action was
negligent) was a certainty. Now, s9(1)(b) provides
that the risk of harm must also be “not insignifi-
cant.” The Ipp Report [37], whose recommendations
were the basis for the CLA [75], provided that:
“The phrase ‘not insignificant’ is intended
to indicate a risk that is of a higher prob-
ability than is indicated by the phrase ‘not
far-fetched or fanciful’, but not so high
as might be indicated by a phrase such as
‘a substantial risk’. The choice of a dou-
ble negative is deliberate. We do not in-
tend the phrase to be a synonym for ‘sig-
nificant’. ‘Significant’ is apt to indicate a
higher degree of probability than we in-
tend.” – at paragraph 7.15.
This test is not to be used when considering cau-
sation of harm nor whether the kind of harm was
reasonably foreseeable from the kind of exposure. It
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is only to be used to determine whether an act was
negligent.
Statistics may be used to determine whether a risk
is not insignificant, but this has not yet been seen in
the courts. Currently it is only if the court accepts
the step from population risk to individual cause on
a balance of probabilities, or accepts a risk estimate
in deciding on whether there has been material con-
tribution on the balance of probabilities, that sound
statistical methodology can assist in moving from
the use of “bare statistics” to providing a sound un-
derpinning of decisions made in these most difficult
and nontraditional problems. Even then the statisti-
cal evidence may not be strong enough on its own to
prove causation, but when used in structured com-
bination with other evidence it can create a very
convincing argument for causation.
APPENDIX A: A TEST-BASED APPROACH
TO CAUSALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS
Test-based approaches to causality in epidemiol-
ogy date essentially to the work of Bradford Hill (see
[30, 31]). Although there are many aspects of his set
of tests which can be criticized [66, 70], in estab-
lishing the population-based relationship (Epop)→
(Opop), for use in a legal context we feel such an
approach is still appropriate. Here we spell out and
illustrate ten such tests, grouped into four types:
theoretical, empirical, statistical and inferential.
A.1 The Theoretical Step
The first set of tests for a causal association relates
to the need for an underlying theory.
Test 1 (Existence of mechanism). Is the pro-
posed association explained by a biologically plausi-
ble mechanism?
Surprisingly, although passing Test 1 may seem
to a layman to be of paramount importance, it is
certainly not always regarded as vital that it be
passed. For example, we are still at an early stage of
understanding cell-level biology; the mechanism for
causing various cancers is quite unknown and there-
fore we cannot and do not expect that the role of
an individual exposure will be explicable in detail.
Thus in the case of exposures suspected of caus-
ing cancer, such as environmental tobacco smoke
or asbestos fibers, we do not have any established
way of passing Test 1. Also, it is not always a rea-
sonable question given current scientific knowledge.
Rothman and Greenland [56] recognize that biologic
plausibility may be solely based on prior beliefs and
not data or logic.
However, one cannot underestimate the value of
a real and positive answer to Test 1 in establish-
ing causality. In revealing the role of sexual activity
in causing the spread of AIDS, the existence of a
biological mechanism was paramount: locating an
AIDS-causing virus that could be spread by such
activity gives a much stronger proof of the causality
than is available for a theory of causation by use of
amyl nitrate, where no such explanation was found.
There are some cautionary notes in assessing Test
1.
It is clearly desirable that the theoretical basis be
verifiable in some way independently of the popu-
lation data collected and used in the steps below,
but this is not always the case. Given the empirical
observations, it is quite common and accepted sci-
entific practice to develop models for the biological
processes involved, based purely on describing the
observations rather than on building a biologically
“causal” model.
These may have an underlying biological rationale
or they might be purely descriptive of the data, such
as the model of Doll and Peto [13], RR(x) = (1+x )z,
where RR(x) is the relative risk of lung cancer as-
sociated with smoking x cigarettes/day, compared
with not smoking. This may look to a nonscientist
like a biologically based explanation of the increase
in relative risk, when in fact it is purely a convenient
mathematical way to describe data. In contrast, the-
oretical models of the structure of the cancer growth
have been developed which can then be assessed for
goodness of fit to the data.
In this vein one may look also at the IUD/PID
relationship. There is an established theory of this
mechanism for, say, the Dalkon Shield: the long “tail”
of the device is supposedly a conductor of infection,
and the lack of such a tail is the reason advanced for
lesser associations with other devices. This is plau-
sible; but is it a theory developed after the data or a
theory with a sound and commonly agreed backing
from biological argument?
Despite the problems involved, biological knowl-
edge should not be discounted; it should just be rec-
ognized as difficult to apply. In any event, if Test 1
is failed, one often resorts to its weaker cousin, Test
2.
Test 2 (Analogous relationships). Is the pro-
posed association analogous to some other accepted
causal association?
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Test 2 is often used as a surrogate for Test 1. For
example, if it is accepted that active smoking causes
lung cancer, then hypothesis that exposure to envi-
ronmental tobacco smoke (ETS) causes lung cancer
might be posed and Test 2 accepted by using the
analogy with active smoking; indeed, exactly this
argument was advanced by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency in its conclusion that ETS is a
carcinogen [15].
However, care needs to be taken when considering
analogous relationships, because scientists can use
their imagination to find analogies to any accepted
mechanism (see [57]). It is a matter for subject area
expertise, not for statistical expertise, to decide how
strong such analogies are. The ETS analogy must be
based on a decision that any toxicological, site, or
other differences between the types of exposure are
irrelevant. A similar analogy between lung cancer ef-
fects of exposure to forms of industrial asbestos, say
chrysotile and crocodilite as mined at Wittenoom,
Australia, may be valid, but this also needs to be
ascertained.
We believe that in many cases the role of Test
2 is unfortunately confused, especially when it sup-
plants rather than separately reinforces Test 1. It is
clearly of great value in initiating an area of study,
but following the central dictum of science that one
cannot prove something merely by asserting it might
be true, it seems that Test 2 on its own is a weak
addition to establishing a causal inference.
As an example, consider again the Wittenoom as-
bestos example. If one accepts the chrysotile expo-
sure results of [1], then Test 2 indicates that expo-
sure to crocodilite may be causal for lung cancer.
One then initiates a study of, say, those exposed to
crocodilite at Wittenoom. If this study enables fur-
ther tests such as those below to be passed, the anal-
ogy argument certainly may appear to have greater
validity; but if they are failed, then one should see
the analogy argument as being falsified, rather than
as continuing to have self-sustained force.
In some studies, even failing Test 2 is not seen
as a major problem. In the study of poppers and
AIDS this was the case: here the level of theoretical
proof appears to be at the weakest form of Test 2,
namely that amyl nitrate is a “foreign substance”
to the body and therefore might by analogy with
other foreign substances be accused of causing al-
most anything.
Regrettably, too often the use of these tests is at
this weak level and we are forced to ignore this la-
cuna in the argument for causality. And yet, as Sir
David Cox reinforces [10], without a biologically or
physically plausible model the leap from association
to causation is a much less convincing one.
Finally, one must point out that due care has to be
taken in separating the “hypothesis-generating” in-
formation in analogous studies from the “hypothesis-
confirming” steps below. Sir Richard Doll [11] notes
an occasion on which this error seems to have led
to an incorrect conclusion that cadmium had con-
tributed to the development of prostate cancer. When
the hypothesis-generating studies are purely com-
parative or anecdotal, this may not be a problem;
when, as with the exposure to spousal smoking, they
seem more rigorous (e.g., the cohort study of [33]),
then the temptation to include them in formal anal-
ysis can be strong.
The third test in this theoretical step is that of
temporality.
Test 3 (Temporality). Does the exposure pre-
cede the outcome?
Little needs to be said about this in theory: if it
fails, then the hypothesis of causality can be elimi-
nated, but if it is passed, we have little further sup-
port for the hypothesis, since simple precedence, as
pointed out by philosophers at length, does not im-
ply causation (see [55]).
Moreover, even where this test is failed and the
outcome does precede the exposure, it does not nec-
essarily follow that the exposure does not cause the
outcome; it only shows that the exposure could not
have caused the outcome in the particular circum-
stances present; see [57] for further discussion.
We note, however, that this test is often hard to
apply in the epidemiological arena. The time of ac-
tual onset of a disease, for example, is frequently
indeterminate, and for exposures such as environ-
mental tobacco smoke, it may be difficult to tell
whether Test 3 is passed or not since the definition
of the exposure is not simple and proper account of
latency time may be difficult. As another example,
in assessing the association of an IUD with pelvic
inflammatory disease, the time of exposure may be
much better established than is time of exposure to
ETS, but time of disease onset (unless acute) may
be at least as hard to establish as for lung cancer.
If passing this test were seen as critical, then on
occasions it would be almost impossible to estab-
lish causality in population-based studies. In gen-
eral, when the relevant times are hard to establish
as above, the test is essentially overlooked. However,
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it can sometimes be valuable in falsifying a causal
hypothesis; for example, this test was used in show-
ing that stress in pregnancy does not cause Down’s
syndrome, since the physical changes start earlier
than the empirically measured stresses in the stud-
ies claiming to provide proof.
A.2 The Empirical Step
Whether because of a firm theory or because of
analogy, the next step in attempting to establish
causation in observational studies is the empirical
step: collecting data which relates to the asserted
causal link and considering the degree of support
given to the assertion by such data.
Consider again the measure of association in a
given empirical study to be the relative risk, de-
noted RR. In theory this describes the expected rate
of outcome per exposed person divided by the ex-
pected rate of outcome per unexposed person.
There are also inherent complexities in measuring
such risks; for more details see [50], who point out
the extra problems which nonstandardization and
interpretation may cause.
The first test in the empirical step is too often
overlooked in scientific analysis, although perhaps
it is overemphasized in legal contexts. It is certainly
supplemental to the usual Bradford Hill tests for
causality.
Test 4 (Validity of data). Are the data collected
valid?
There are a number of aspects relevant to answer-
ing this question. Feinstein [16] raises many issues
which need to be clarified in nonrandomized stud-
ies, as do Chalmers [6] and Mosteller and Chalmers
[46].
First, and regrettably, it must be admitted that
all too often arguments are based on data contain-
ing mistakes. It is very easy for such errors to creep
into studies, and forgiveness of human error may be
partly why this step is overlooked in scientific ar-
gument. In practice, a small number of mistakes in
data (especially in a large study) should not affect
conclusions if they are otherwise clear-cut. When
they are not, the effect of the errors may be sub-
stantial.
For example, the data by Hirayama [32, 33], on
which one of the first assertions of a relationship be-
tween exposure to ETS and lung cancer was made,
appears to contain some subjects who are dead in
1981 and alive again in 1984, although this did not
substantially alter the conclusions. Garfinkel, Auer-
bach and Joubert [19] showed that classifying smok-
ers as nonsmokers may give a 25% invalidity rate in
hospital studies of this same phenomenon. In this ex-
ample, the empirical relative risks are only around
RR from 0.8 to 1.5 [67], so the effect of such errors
may be substantial: on the basis of data available
at the time, Lee [39, 40] held that misclassification
of subjects could account for the whole of the ob-
served raised risk of lung cancer in ETS-exposed
subjects. Another dramatic example is given by Kro-
nmal, Whitney and Mumford [35], who claim that
much of the data on which the Dalkon Shield was
evaluated might have been in error in substantial
ways, and that up to one third of these data may
have been omitted from analysis; the reanalysis in
[35] claims that the original study overstated the rel-
ative risk (originally set at RR = 12.0) by a factor
of some 30%. This issue is also addressed by Lee,
Rubin and Borucki [38]. See also the discussion in
[24] and [52].
Second, studies may be prone to different sys-
tematic errors and biases. These include biases due
to interviewer practices, questionnaire design, poor
handling of missing values, poor definitions or mea-
surement practices, or lack of representativeness of
the study; the list is long. Feinstein [16] has a very
good discussion of these issues. But if these biases
exist, then the validity of the data is impaired and
the conclusions cannot be automatically trusted.
In passing or failing this test one needs, in gen-
eral, far more information than is usually available
to anyone other than the original researcher. Usu-
ally, at most an outsider can use general statisti-
cal principles to identify the potential problems of a
poor study using tests of principles of design. It is
often only when access is given to raw data (as in the
Kronmal, Whitney and Mumford [35] reanalysis of
the Dalkon Shield and related data), or occasionally
when dual or followup publication occurs (as in the
Hirayama study [32, 33]), that data-based critical
review is possible.
Because the detection of errors or design flaws is
much easier to raise in nontechnical ways, it is of-
ten part of the normal legal procedure to address
such questions at some length. Statisticians can play
a useful and constructive role in this by develop-
ing “what-if” approaches to see how badly a study
might be affected by potential biases and errors (see
[67, 69] for a relevant example). This enables one to
assess whether the degree of failure on any of these
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matters of fact is sufficient to invalidate the conclu-
sions drawn or just weaken their strength.
Now let us turn to the analysis of studies assuming
they are validly conducted. There are then a num-
ber of further tests which can be considered in this
empirical step.
Test 5 (Strength of association). Is the observed
association a strong one?
There is a subjective assessment needed to decide
that an association, measured for example by a rel-
ative risk, is strong. How strong is strong? All that
can be said rigorously is that the contribution to
proof of causality is greater for larger observed rela-
tive risks (and even this has to be qualified as in the
discussion of the statistical step below). Indeed, Doll
[11] downplays this aspect of testing for causality to
almost a nonissue.
An ancillary reason for preferring to accept stron-
ger associations is that they also allow for a little
laxity in Test 4. Where there is strong association
between the exposure and the harm, it is not likely
that this association could be explained by another
factor that was not considered, that is, an omitted
variable (OV). In order for the OV to explain the as-
sociation between the exposure and the harm, two
conditions must be met. First, the relative risk of the
OV must be greater than that of the requisite ex-
posure. Second, the prevalence of the OV in the ex-
posed group must generally be substantially greater
than that in the unexposed group. This is known as
the Cornfield Inequality [9] and is discussed by Yu
and Gastwirth [74].
There is some agreement that a relative risk below
2.0 is not indicative of a strong association [11, 43]
and may occur through misclassification and other
errors. Associations with such low relative risks are
only likely to be accepted as causal if the other tests
are passed at a much more stringent level. It is much
harder to observe spuriously generated relative risks
above the level of, say, 3.0 or 4.0, even from studies
with systematic biases or errors in data.
It must be stressed that, although a positive an-
swer to Test 5 is a useful part of building the case
for causality, a negative answer is not of much use
in demolishing such a case. A weak association does
not mean that there is not any causal connection.
There may well be exposures which cause cancers,
say, but only contribute a small fraction of the over-
all population rate of occurrence; if studied in suffi-
cient detail, these could lead to weak but still accu-
rate measures of association.
A strong association between the exposure and
the outcome merely eliminates the possibility that
a weak confounder or some other bias is entirely
responsible for the association.
Test 6 (Lack of confounders). Are there other
aspects of the study group that might explain the ob-
served association?
The need to establish a causal link for the individ-
ual certainly appears to require that (to some ap-
propriate and reasonable extent) there are no other
potential causes which may have led to the observed
outcomes. Thus removal of confounding effects must
be a key consideration when invoking results of epi-
demiological studies in legal situations, but it is un-
realistic to believe that all such effects can be re-
moved; see [12] and [56]. This necessitates quite ex-
plicit evaluation of the components (A), (E) and (O)
of the chain to uncover the real links in the tricom-
ponent model described above.
Examples of confounders and their interaction are
given in Section 2.4. For example, the purported ex-
posure (E) may be indirectly associated with (O)
through an independent exposure in such a way that
there is in fact no causal relationship between (E)
and (O). The problem becomes more complex when
a number of different exposures are involved, in which
case they may impact on (O) independently (and
hence conform to an additive model of risk) or in-
teractively (in which case a synergistic description
may apply). Disentangling the links is vital to un-
derstanding the impact of exposures on outcome and
hence whether and to what extent (E) can be held
responsible for (O).
Alternatively, it is also possible that the risk fac-
tor lowers the estimated relative risk so as to mask a
meaningful effect. This occurs where the risk factor
has a relative risk greater than that of the exposure
in question and is more prevalent in the unexposed
than the exposed group. This is known as the Re-
verse Cornfield Inequality; as Yu and Gastwirth [74]
write, it is especially useful when a study yields a
“suggestive finding” such as a RR of 1.50.
Where the epidemiologist has an understanding of
the possible biases so as to be able to give a quan-
titative assessment of the bias, the uncertainty can
be accounted for by using a sensitivity analysis to
illustrate the possible extent of the biases. However,
when the possible cause of the bias is unknown or
there are several different exposures, then an ordi-
nary sensitivity analysis should be abandoned. The
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accuracy in the quantification of confounding effects
can be improved upon by using other methods such
as Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis and Bayesian
bias analysis (see [64]).
Thus this test, although part of the empirical step,
is also one in which statistical expertise is of value.
Furthermore, part of the professional skill of a statis-
tician lies in designing studies without such con-
founding factors, or in designing forms of analysis
which can take them into account.
The next test is in many ways the key to establish-
ing scientific proof in a traditional sense. It requires
that, for a causal association to be established, the
same effect should follow the same cause in a num-
ber of studies, or in repeated studies, in a consistent
way.
Test 7 (Consistency of association). Is the as-
sociation consistently found over a number of stud-
ies?
There are a number of ill-defined terms in this
test. How consistent is consistent? How many stud-
ies are needed? Must they all be the same in general
structure?
As so often, these are a matter for judgment. But
what is clear is that an association observed only
once, no matter how clear-cut it seems, should not
be taken as causal unless it can be repeated. Of
course, the stronger and more clear-cut the first ob-
servation, the more likely we are to believe that
we have “almost” established causality; but then,
if the causality is so obvious, often the construction
of confirmatory studies should be almost trivial. Of
course, with a large positive study there is a ten-
dency to expect that further studies are not needed;
but we again cite Doll’s example [11] of cadmium
and prostate cancer as an illustration of the caution.
It should be noted that consistency of results
among studies does not necessarily mean that their
statistical significance is the same. Nor for that mat-
ter are studies with differing significance results in-
consistent. As has already been mentioned, there is
almost always more than one causal factor present.
Hence, the significance of association for the main
exposure may vary between populations and times
because the other causal factors will not vary in the
same way as the main exposure, as suggested by
Rothman and Greenland [57].
One aspect of this test which appears worth stress-
ing is that if all other factors are equal, later studies
should in principle provide better confirmation than
earlier studies. This is not only because of the sim-
ple point that the early studies are often, inherently
and unavoidably, hypothesis generating. It is due
to the more subtle fact that if a relationship is in-
deed causal, then later studies should be designed to
avoid confounders and other pitfalls to which earlier
studies are prone. Hence causal associations should
be more and more consistently visible as time pro-
gresses. However, this may be mitigated by “reme-
diation bias,” in which later studies may not repro-
duce earlier stronger results because of actions, such
as reduction of exposure, taken on the basis of the
earlier studies.
There may be exceptions to this test. If an associ-
ation is geographically or temporally specific, then
extra studies elsewhere or at another time may not
confirm it, but then as with any confounding we do
not have a general relationship anyway and only the
relevant population must be considered. If the bio-
logical mechanism is well accepted, we may relax
the need for extra studies, for example in the case
of exposure to nuclear explosion radiation and out-
come of cancer. But in general, repeatability, both
conceptually and in fact, lies at the basis of the sci-
entific method and one would need strong reasons
not to require it as part of a proof of causality in
population studies.
A.3 The Statistical Step
The next step in establishing a causal association
is the statistical step; this will most often in practice
take place simultaneously with the empirical step.
As detailed above, in Tests 4–7, we have been act-
ing as though there were a true measured associa-
tion, known exactly, whose strength we could assess
and whose consistency we could judge.
This is not true. Even in a situation where our
empirical studies are well designed, there is still the
role of chance (or luck, as Doll and Peto call it [13])
in allocating the characteristics of the actual group
of individuals studied.
Hence, we may observe a high relative risk when
in fact there is no effect at all, just because by pure
bad luck we saw far more effects in the particular
(usually small) group of exposed subjects examined
than we should have; conversely, we may miss a true
association (especially a weak one) for the same rea-
son.
Thus we use the concepts of “statistical signifi-
cance,” “confidence intervals” and “power” in eval-
uating the validity of associations observed. Around
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a relative risk of RR we may construct a so-called
confidence interval (CI), comprising an upper con-
fidence limit (UCL) and a lower confidence limit
(LCL). This gives a range within which we are “con-
fident” that the true measure of association lies;
the technical interpretation of “confidence” in this
context is important and differs in frequentist and
Bayesian paradigms.
Although a 95% CI is often adopted, confidence
intervals of different size (e.g., 90% or 80%) are also
used in certain situations, depending on the degree
to which one wishes to rule out other possible ex-
planations, in particular chance.
The first consequence of this approach is to give us
a range of values for which we should use the tests of
the previous section. For Test 5, on Strength of As-
sociation, we should thus perhaps be more stringent
for the type of compensable cases considered here:
we really want to know that the LCL rather than the
relative risk RR itself is large, since a relative risk
of 10.0 is not of great value in asserting a strong
association if the LCL is only 0.5! Doll [11] cites a
value of 2.0 for the LCL as one where he feels there
would be “. . . seldom any difficulty in accepting a
hazard.”
Conversely, for Test 7, on Consistency of Associ-
ation, we can be somewhat more lenient, once we
recognize that there is uncertainty in the estima-
tion of the true relative risks and we can compare
the ranges (LCL, UCL) compatible with the studies
to see whether there is consistency or not. In addi-
tion, many meta-analysis techniques which are used
to combine results from different studies (see [28])
may enable us to identify heterogeneity, or extra un-
explained inconsistency, between studies.
Perhaps more central in the use of the statistical
step, and certainly the most obvious use of statis-
tical thinking in most presentations, is the idea of
statistical significance. If in fact we had no associa-
tion, then the true value of RR should be 1.0. But
if 1.0 lies outside the range (LCL,UCL), it follows
logically that there is a less than 5% chance (i.e.,
less than 1 in 20 chance) that the association is due
to a random choice of subjects (i.e., “bad luck”),
and then we say the relative risk, or the association
itself, is “statistically significant.”
This sketch of statistical practice is intended to
assist the interpretation of the crucial next test.
Test 8 (Statistical significance). Is the observed
association statistically significant?
If not, then in the same way as in Test 6, we have
failed to exclude one of the possible causes of our
observations: in this case, not a physical confounder
but the confounding effect of sheer variation in our
choice of subjects, that is, the effect of chance.
In practice, for compensable cases this test should
precede many if not all of the tests in the previous
section. As Doll points out [11], “that chance may
be the explanation of a raised [risk] is, of course,
the first possibility that any epidemiologist will con-
sider.” For if this test is failed (i.e., if the results are
not statistically significant), then the questions of
the strength of the association, or whether the as-
sociation might be caused by confounding factors,
or even questions such as temporal ordering or bi-
ological plausibility, are moot at least until more
information is gathered. We have, if Test 8 is failed,
a phenomenon that could have been caused by ran-
dom fluctuations in the population alone.
Thus we certainly cannot describe a causal rela-
tionship as proved.
Failing this test certainly does not show the causal
relationship is false. Lack of significance is often no
more than an indication that the study is too small
to prove the hypothesis; one toss of a coin, for exam-
ple, can never convince us that we have a double-
headed penny. Alternatively, if an outcome is suf-
ficiently rare in a population, then even a large co-
hort study may fail to have the power to detect it. A
meta-analysis also makes it possible to see whether,
in combination, chance is excluded in the pattern
of observed results even if the individual studies are
not significant; if used with care, this can be a useful
tool in the assessment of significance.
Test 9 (Dose-response relationship). Is there an
increase in magnitude of outcome from an increas-
ing level of exposure?
There is a second, essentially statistical, test which
if passed is an extra building block in constructing
a proof of the causality hypothesis.
This is often referred to as the “coherency” test.
This test will be passed if there is cause-and-effect
interpretation from the epidemiology study which is
consistent with the history and biology of the dis-
ease. There will be times when this test is failed:
if, for example, we have a lethal substance at any
level of exposure, or if there is a threshold effect and
all observations are above the threshold. In general,
however, a biological or physical plausibility argu-
ment is used to justify the use of this test, and it is
certainly a convincing test when passed.
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Test 9 also interacts with Test 4. If there is a sys-
tematic bias in the data (say, systematic misclas-
sification, as is possible in the ETS example [67]),
then we might not expect such bias to increase with
increasing exposure; so even if we had established
significance under Test 8 we would find that Test
9, for dose-response, failed. This may indicate, for
exposures not instantly toxic, that although there is
some nonchance exposure producing the result we
observed, it might not be the hypothesized causal
agent, but may be some other agent entirely. Exam-
ination of possible confounders, as described by Test
6, may help to explain this. Alternatively, associa-
tions that have a dose-response relationship may not
necessarily be causal because a confounding effect
may demonstrate a biological gradient in its rela-
tion with the disease, as provided by Rothman and
Greenland [57].
Why is this a statistical test? In order to ascertain
if there is a real increase in outcome (i.e., increase
in risk), not just a random fluctuation at different
dosage levels, we need statistical techniques similar
to but more sophisticated than those which allow us
to decide that the overall effect is statistically sig-
nificant. These often rely on models of some com-
plexity: linear or log-linear models, often derived for
mathematical convenience with little or no biolog-
ical underpinning, as discussed in Section A.1. As
mentioned in Section 4, in Seltsam [100] Spigelman
did consider dose-response relationship as a relevant
factor; however, because of the more technical na-
ture of this test, there may be inappropriate and un-
questioning acceptance of a study’s reported dose-
response results in the legal system, and it can be
hard to get sufficient data to verify that the test does
hold. Nevertheless, the effort to address this test is
worthwhile, and indeed Doll [11] stresses the value
of coherency in responding not just to intensity of
exposure but also to duration of exposure, and even
to time since first exposure.
More than most, this test may be failed without
too much penalty; in many cases there is just not
enough data to make clearcut judgments, as is the
case in the ETS and lung cancer example [68].
A.4 The Inferential Step
There is a final step if all or some of the above
tests have been satisfied. This is the inferential step,
in which the individual pieces of the argument are
joined together to form a logical conclusion.
Test 10 (Validity of logic). Is the conclusion ac-
tually justified by the data and analysis presented?
This seems trite, stated in this way. And yet we
find in, say, Wu-Williams et al. [73] the statement
that “ETS is causal for cancer despite the data shown
here.”
Such a test should, ideally, involve attention to all
of the preceding tests, and if a causal relationship
is claimed, then the degree to which it is based on
each test should be defined properly. This is rarely
if ever done in a formalized sense; indeed, even the
Bradford Hill criteria, which are less explicit than
those posed here, are rarely “ticked off” in any sys-
tematic way. For example, the second EPA Draft
Report [15] (see also [14]) tests the causality of ETS
for lung cancer by using, quite explicitly, only Test
2 under the claim that this test is so well satisfied
that no other approach is needed. There are indeed
celebrated instances in which a systematic approach
of any kind seems sadly missing: Stolley [65] opines
that R. A. Fisher, in defending no causal link be-
tween active smoking and lung cancer, had used “in-
complete and highly selected data. . . with scant at-
tempts to weigh the evidence or reveal the obvious
deficiencies in his data.” On the other hand, even
when there are attempts to validate the tests above
(or versions of them), it is often the case that Test
10 is only weakly satisfied.
So the final test is not always as simple-minded as
it may seem and, overall, it is the most important:
as Doll [11] states, that “if there is one general rule,
it is that conclusions can be reached only after the
totality of the evidence is taken into account.”
Scientific proof of causality may always be fragile,
always falsifiable. For some reasons, such as taking
precautionary steps in setting public health policies,
it may not be necessary to prove an association is
causal in this way.
But in the legal context, in which a court will re-
quire proof that an exposure (E) actually is causally
related to an outcome (O), it is vital in our view
that at least the pragmatic approach detailed here,
culminating in a firm and logical statement of the
passing of tests, should be required before any such
conclusion is attempted.
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